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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
BACKGROUND
In 2001 the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament adopted two Regulations on the
reinforcement of the EU response against Antipersonnel Landmines (APL).1 These (referred to
collectively as “the Regulation”) laid the foundation of an integrated and focused European
policy. The Regulation states the need to regularly assess operations financed by the Community
and that the European Commission (EC) shall submit to the European Parliament an overall
assessment of all Community mine action. To implement these provisions, the EC commissioned
a global assessment of EC mine policy and actions over the period 2002-2004 and entered into an
agreement with the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) to, inter
alia, manage the programme of regional evaluations to identify lessons learned within EC-funded
mine action projects in the six regions, one of which is the Middle East.
The regional evaluations complement the Global Assessment by focusing on relevant conclusions
and recommendations from the Global Assessment, and EC mine action strategy and
programming issues at the country level. The evaluation will not assess the efficiency,
effectiveness, and impact of individual projects, except to illustrate changes since the Global
Assessment or critical programming issues.
METHODOLOGY
The evaluation covered the period 2002 until today. Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan and Yemen were
selected of which Iraq could only be covered with a desk review because of security constraints.
The Evaluation Team comprised of Ralf Otto and Steinar Essen of Channel Research. The key
phases of the study were a desk study in April, a field trip to Yemen in April, a field trip to
Jordan in May, interviews with EC officials in parallel and a field trip to Lebanon in June. All
together 64 persons were interviewed either in person, by telephone or questionnaire.
The only significant constraint in this study was the limited availability of some EC officials for
interviews and the denial of access to some of the documentation despite requests from the
evaluation team and EC staff supporting this study.
OVERVIEW OF EC FUNDED MINE ACTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST
The total amount of funding to Mine Action (MA in the Middle East is more or less the same in
the two periods that are covered by the two EC global MA strategies (€ 10.37 million in 20022004 and 10.83 million in 2005-2007). The percentage of the total funding to MA rose from 7%
to 10% in that period. The constancy reflected in these figures is misleading.
The biggest part of the funding during 200204 went to Iraq in 2003 and was related to
the emergency situation. There was no
funding for Yemen and Jordan during this
period. In the following years the funding
was more diverse but did not include Iraq
anymore. Funding varies from year to year
and from country to country.
1

Regulation (EC) 1724/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2001 concerning
action against anti-personnel landmines in developing countries (OJ L 234, 1.9.2001, p.1) and Regulation
(EC) 1725/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2001 concerning action against
anti-personnel landmines in third countries other than developing countries (OJ L 234, 1.9.2001, p.6). The
provisions are similar and we quote from Regulation (EC) 1724/2001.
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EC funding to the region was divided into two categories: funding to countries in a crisis (Iraq
and Lebanon); and funding to countries in a more stable situation (Yemen and Jordan). The
majority of funding went to humanitarian demining in the crisis countries (70%).
EC MINE ACTION STRATEGY FOR THE MIDDLE EAST
There is no specific EC strategy for MA for the Middle East and EC Country Strategy Papers
(CSPs) in general do not include MA. In the case of Iraq no CSP exists. The application of the
EC global MA strategies (the Regulation) in the four countries is not coherent. By looking at the
priorities in these strategies and the funding decisions taken, it can be shown that there is no
stringent logic and that funding decisions cannot always be attributed to strategic objectives. The
majority of EC officials interviewed declared that they were not aware of the MA strategies or
confirmed that they did not use it as a reference for funding decisions. Regarding humanitarian
demining there is no specific strategy. The global MA strategy does refer to humanitarian need
and the role of MA in humanitarian aid, but the strategy does not explicitly state objectives and
strategic priorities for humanitarian demining.
REGIONAL APPROACH TO MINE ACTION
Countries in the Middle East have national mine problems that can be addressed nationally.
National entities are entrusted with the task. The need to respond to MA problems does not in
general have regional implications. Present and potential new conflicts between countries in the
region are a regional aspect. Their relevance for MA lies mainly on the side of prevention and in
the diplomatic area. A few aspects related to clearance and the Middle East as a region could be
observed (for example regional budget lines and strategies). These aspects can be seen as
marginal compared to the fact that the MA problem can and should be addressed nationally.
COORDINATION WITH EUROPEAN UNION-MEMBER STATES
If at all, coordination between the EC and Member States regarding funding to MA in the Middle
East takes place at national level in the beneficiary countries (EC delegations, embassies). In the
four countries no specific coordination mechanism for MA exists between the EC and Member
States. If coordination takes place it happens within the overall donor coordination process
(reconstruction, development). Funding in MA is often channelled through the United Nations
(UN) and coordination is left to the UN and the national stakeholder.
A number of Member States do have focal persons for MA in their governments. There is no
structure or communication set up for these focal points to communicate with the EC about MA.
It was stated that there is no need to have a specific coordination mechanism between the EU and
Member States for MA globally as the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) gives the
framework, sets the goals and provides for a coordination structure. Nonetheless, in all interviews
with Member States, representatives stated their wish to have a forum for exchange and
information. In the past there have been meetings regarding MA between the European Union
(EU) and Member States but since the thematic budget line no longer exists, these meetings have
been suspended.
NON-GOVERNMENTAL IMPLEMENTING PARTNERS
The EC is funding Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) directly only in Lebanon and Iraq.
These are countries in emergencies where DG ECHO supports NGOs. Other funding for MA in
the region went entirely to United Nations Development Program (UNDP).
NGOs in the field in general benefit from a person in the NGO Headquarter (HQ) who is aware
of EC procedures and developments. For NGOs it is easier to link up with DG ECHO than with
other EC services (to obtain information, to be aware of funding strategies and priorities). This is
partly because they are used to work with DG ECHO and partly because DG ECHO’s procedures
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are perceived as clear and straight forward.
NGOs are aware of the increased importance of EC delegations. However, NGOs still have very
limited knowledge about new EC instruments (and, in particular knowledge of the Stability
Instrument) or how funding procedures work. The case of Lebanon shows that this could lead to
difficulties regarding efficiency and appropriate exit strategies.
COUNTRY FINDINGS
Lebanon
The situation in Lebanon in general and in the MA sector in particular is characterized by
instability. Although still contaminated with an ‘old’ landmines problem the situation changed
significantly with the Israeli Lebanese conflict in summer 2006 and the new cluster munitions
problem. The MA Sector in Lebanon is well established and more complex than in the other
countries examined in this study. The country is divided into two zones because of the
peacekeeping operations of the UN in the south, with the Mine Action Coordination Center South
Lebanon (MACC SL – a project of the UN Mine Action Service – UNMAS) south of the Litani
River, and the Lebanon Mine Action Center (LMAC – supported by UNDP) responsible for the
rest of the country. All humanitarian clearance in South Lebanon is coordinated through MACC
SL.
Before the crisis in 2006 the EC – as well as other Western donors – did not pay much attention
to the landmine problem. After 2006, funding to MA rose by more than ten times. EC funding
after the war in 2006 is characterized by a challenge to avoid gaps in funding MA, first from
humanitarian budget lines and, later, from European Neighbourhood Partnership Instrument
(ENPI). This was further complicated by changing predictions of the end date for clearance of
cluster munitions in the south.
Overall the EC funding to Lebanon is relevant. The EC proved to be responsive to the situation
and to developments in the sector. The fluctuating situation in Lebanon made a flexible approach
necessary and the EC showed flexibility and responsiveness. Nevertheless the weakness of this
re-active approach becomes clear today when prolonged funding to the sector and the need for an
exit strategy require a more strategic, better planned approach.
Regarding efficiency the decision of DG ECHO to fund four international NGOs in 2006 and
2007 for the clearance of cluster munitions instead of one or two only, is questionable in terms of
efficiency and integration into longer term planning. Regarding the choice of funding channels
the EC was mainly following administrative imperatives rather than taking strategic decisions.
The missing strategic vision and planning for an exit becomes relevant when it comes to Linking
Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD). Although the MA intervention after the 2006
crisis is, without doubt, relevant and is contributing to reduced suffering, there is no direct link
between the MA funding and the recovery or reconstruction process in the country. The activities
for humanitarian demining appear isolated and are not linked to other EC funded programs.
Jordan
Landmines in Jordan are located in military-controlled border areas in the northern Syrian border
area, the Jordan Valley and Wadi Araba. They are marked, mapped and partly fenced today.
Jordan is actively pursuing the resolution of the landmine problem. Jordan signed and ratified the
APMBC in 1998. The EU is a long-standing partner of Jordan. The EC funded UNDP to support
Jordan in doing a technical survey, demining and training of deminers.
The EC funding of MA in Jordan is highly relevant. Jordan today has managed to provide its own
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means and to secure from external sources the funds needed to resolve the landmine problem. So
far as could be assessed during the field visit, it seems likely the EC funded program that ends in
2008 will meet all of its objectives.
None of the EC strategy papers for Jordan nor the project document for the project funded via the
UNDP contain any direct link between MA and the development process. The programme is
limited to the clearance activities and to the capacity development of the counterpart. The project
does not foresee any activities directly related to the use of the land, nor does it link to another
initiative to bridge the gap with potential follow-up development activities.
Yemen
As a result of several conflicts Yemen is contaminated with both antipersonnel and anti-vehicle
mines and other Explosive Remnants of War (ERW). Most landmines were laid in pre-unification
border areas between northern and southern Yemen. The Government of Yemen is committed to
eliminate the impact of mines and Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) in Yemen. Yemen signed the
APMBC on December 1997 and has now requested an extension until 2015 for fulfilling its
APMBC obligations for clearing all known mined areas.
Mine clearance in Yemen is undertaken solely by Yemen Mine Action Centre YEMAC)
involving staff seconded from the Ministry of Defense. The direct EC support to MA in Yemen is
limited to the funding of a UNDP programme, which has been running since 1999. The EC
supports Phase III of the program only.
There has been no EC funding for MA in Yemen prior to 2007 although the situation in Yemen
was eligible under the EC strategy for MA for 2002-2004. The EC is funding other sectors in
Yemen and contributes to the reduction of poverty. There is no linkage between this funding and
the funding to MA.
Iraq
Iraq is one of the countries most severely affected by landmines and ERW. Since the 2003
invasion, almost daily attacks with car bombs or other improvised explosive devices indicate that
huge amounts of Abandoned Explosive Ordnance (AXO) were left unsecured after the overthrow
of the Hussein regime and subsequently plundered for use in ongoing insurgencies.
The Republic of Iraq acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty in August 2007. The Iraq’s National Mine
Action Authority (NMAA) was established in 2003 but closed down in 2007 due to corruption,
political turbulence, changes of management and insecurity (kidnapping). The Kurdish Regional
Government assumed responsibility for MA in three northern governorates. UNDP has provided
institutional development and local capacity development support to the NMAA and regional
MA centers. Demining in Iraq is conducted by international forces and the national military,
NGOs and commercial demining operators. A number of international NGOs are present in the
country.
The EC’s support to MA in Iraq is limited to the years 2003 and 2004 (funding decisions in
2003). The funding to Iraq is characterized by the fact that the EC announced its decision not to
fund operations in Iraq anymore after 2003. This decision is linked to the security situation and
the fact that the EC cannot ensure proper monitoring and financial oversight without a presence
in the country. The decision concerns the MA sector and raises some doubts. The need for
humanitarian demining increased after 2003. European and non-European donors are funding
MA program in Iraq whereas the EC, as one of the biggest humanitarian donors in the world, is
not. The operators that received funding until 2003 are still present in the country and continue to
work with funds from other donors but are not able to address all needs because of the extent of
the problem.
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CONCLUSIONS
1. EC funding to the region is overall relevant. The EU does not follow a regional strategy or
approach for the Middle East which is appropriate as the few regional aspects of MA in the
Middle East are outweighed by the national elements (national strategies, national actors).
Potential regional initiatives to complement national MA programmes are best viewed from a
diplomatic perspective of conflict prevention and peace building.
2. The global EC strategy does not play an important role in determining funding decisions in the
Middle East. The global strategy is more important at Brussels level than at country level. Some
EC officials perceive strategic planning and decision-making in the MA sector as difficult due to
the lack of strategic guidance from the Regulation, technical aspects in the MA sector and other
sector specific aspects.
3. Funding to MA in the Middle East is fragmented. In some cases the funding is not coherent.
Only some common aspects can be identified in the region (funding to the UN, differentiation
between countries in crisis and more stable countries).
4. Humanitarian Demining is of importance in the region and is addressed by the EC. However
there is no specific strategy for humanitarian demining, nor any guidelines or a concept on how to
integrate humanitarian demining into a reconstruction context.
5. The EC is generally supporting assessments of the MA problem in the region, in particular by
funding Landmine Impact Surveys (LIS). In some contexts the baseline data, methodology and
quality of assessments is not sufficient in terms of comprehensiveness and reliability.
6. The funding emphasis is on clearance which is appropriate overall. In three of the four
countries a landmine/UXO free country is a realistic option and can be achieved in the near
future.
7. For the most part, EC funding to MA is not explicitly integrated into wider national
reconstruction or development strategies. Linkages are limited in the sense that MA programmes
take place in the wider reconstruction and development context but there is no joint planning for
broader results or specific emphasis or measures on linkages between programmes.
8. Operationalising the concept of LRRD is still a challenge. Whereas DG ECHO procedures are
flexible and comparably fast, procedures of other instruments are less flexible and slow.
9. The Middle East is not a priority region for MA within the EC. Before and after the
cancellation of the thematic budget line, EC officials did not pay much attention to MA in the
region (with the exception of humanitarian demining). By choosing the UN (and in particular
UNDP) for the support to national structures, the EC follows a low profile approach in the region.
10. Funding of the EC and of Member States is overall coherent when it comes to selecting target
countries, objectives and approaches. The most significant divergence is the case of Iraq, where
EU Member States fund humanitarian demining but the EC does not.
11. Coherence in funding to MA in the region is achieved despite the lack of coordination
mechanisms in the countries, the region, or at European capital level. The APMBC and
instruments provide the overall coordination framework for donors, including the EC and
Member States.
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12. Direct funding to NGOs is, in general, provided only for humanitarian demining. The
procedure and management follows DG ECHO standard procedures, which is not always
appropriate as MA operations have some specifications different from other sectors.
13. The EC and other donors face difficulties in responding to the challenge of cluster munitions.
Weak assessments and difficulties in determining realistic end dates for clearance are a
programming challenge for donors.
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. The EC should continue to work with national approaches in the Middle East and does not
need to think about an explicit regional strategy for MA.
2. The EC should consider more specific guidance to those within the EC who are dealing with
planning and MA strategies at the national level. To achieve better guidance in MA for the EC
delegations, the EC should consider a focal point at Brussels level or in the region.
3. In countries with a stable environment, the EC should follow the global strategy in a more
coherent way. If the EC decides to support a country’s effort in fulfilling the APMBC obligations
this should be done coherently and based on a strategic approach.
4. In countries with an ongoing or recent crisis the EC should continue to fund MA quickly and
flexibly regardless the countries’ commitment to the APMBC.
5. The EC should put a higher emphasis on the challenge of LRRD related to demining. The EC
(and, in particular, DG ECHO) should consider a specific sectoral strategy for humanitarian
demining and related guidelines. To achieve these aspects DG ECHO should consider a focal
point for MA in Brussels.
6. The EC should continue to fund assessments in MA. This could be LIS as has been funded in
the past but also socio economic impact studies for mine and cluster ammunition affected areas.
7. In the four countries assessed, the EC should continue (or, in the case of Iraq, start) to focus
funding of clearance activities. The EC should continue to fund MA in the region until all
countries have fulfilled their treaty obligations. Where the EC is funding programmes which do
not only have a focus on fast clearance of contaminated sites, the EC should increase efforts in
linking MA to reconstruction and development goals.
8. If the EC is funding MA in the region, it should be strategically and properly followed-up. To
facilitate strategic planning and oversight, the EC should consider a focal point in Brussels or in
the region.
9. The EC should reconsider its decision not to fund MA in Iraq.
10. The EC should consider increased information exchange and coordination with EU Member
States without creating any mechanisms that would overlap with coordination under the APMBC.
To facilitate information exchange between the EC and Member States the EC should consider a
focal point at Brussels level.
11. The EC should learn from the response to the cluster munitions problem in South Lebanon
and ensure that, in future contexts, the lessons learnt are applied. This could be done by
developing specific guidelines for cluster munitions problems or by developing compilations of
good practice cases.
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12. The EC should apply a coherent approach when it comes to requirements for oversight and
programme ownership. In particular in Iraq the EC should reconsider the decision not to fund
MA (or other humanitarian activities) because of the impossibility of monitoring and controlling.
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1. INTRODUCTION
BACKGROUND
In 2001 the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament adopted two Regulations on the
reinforcement of the EU response against Antipersonnel Landmines (APL).2 These (referred to
collectively as “the Regulation”) laid the foundation of the European integrated and focused
policy. Article 13, paragraph 1 of the EC Regulation states that:
“The Commission shall regularly assess operations financed by the Community in order
to establish whether the objectives of the operations have been achieved and to provide
guidelines for improving the effectiveness of future operations.”
The APL Regulation goes on to state:
“Every three years after entry into force of this Regulation, the Commission shall submit
to the European Parliament an overall assessment of all Community mine actions (…).”3
The EC Mine Action Strategy and Multi-annual Indicative Programme, 2005-20074 further
specifies that “more specific, geographic, evaluations of EC-funded mine actions, analysing the
results and their impact” will be undertaken to complement the overall assessment.
To implement these provisions, the EC:
1. Commissioned a global assessment of EC mine policy and actions over the period 20022004;
2. Entered into an agreement with The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian
Demining (GICHD) to, inter alia, manage the programme of regional evaluations to
identify lessons learned within EC-funded mine action projects in the following regions:
Africa
Asia-Pacific

Caucasus-Central Asia
Europe

Latin America
Middle East

The general objective of the Global Assessment was to determine to what extent the objectives
and means set in the APL Regulation had been complied with and used in terms of strategy,
programming, commitments and implementation. The Report from the Global Assessment was
issued in March 2005,5 while the agreement with the GICHD was concluded in December that
year. In April 2008 GICHD contracted Channel Research to undertake the regional evaluation for
the Middle East.
The regional evaluations complement the Global Assessment by focusing on
2

Regulation (EC) 1724/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2001 concerning
action against anti-personnel landmines in developing countries (OJ L 234, 1.9.2001, p.1) and Regulation
(EC) 1725/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2001 concerning action against
anti-personnel landmines in third countries other than developing countries (OJ L 234, 1.9.2001, p.6). The
provisions are similar and we quote from Regulation (EC) 1724/2001.
3
Article 14
4
This is the second strategy and multi-year indicative programme since the adoption of the EC Regulation:
the first covered the period 2002-04.
5
Gasser, Russell and Robert Keeley, Global Assessment of EC Mine Policy and Actions: 2002-2004.
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(i) relevant conclusions and recommendations from the Global Assessment, and
(ii) EC mine action strategy and programming issues at the country level.
Thus, the evaluation will not assess the efficiency, effectiveness, and impact of individual
projects, except to illustrate changes since the Global Assessment or critical programming issues.
Overall objective of the evaluation:
To provide systematic and objective assessments of EC-funded mine action in the Middle East to
generate credible and useful lessons for decision-makers within the EC, allowing them to
improve the planning and management of existing and future mine action projects, programmes,
and policies.
Specific objectives of the evaluation:
•

•
•

•
•

•
•
•
•

•

To assess the relevance of EC-funded mine activities vis-à-vis:
 the geographic and thematic priorities defined in the Strategies for 2002-2004 and
2005-2007;
 national and regional needs, strategies, and priorities;
 EC Country Strategy Papers and National Indicative Programmes for mine-affected
countries in the Middle East 2002-2007;
 EC strategy documents for the Middle East
To analyze the allocation of EC funds among mine-affected states in the Middle East, and
across the various components of mine action (survey, clearance, MRE, etc.);6
To assess the effectiveness of EC-funded mine action support in:
 addressing the landmine & UXO problems in mine-affected partner countries
 fostering national ownership and the development of local capacities;
 supporting the overall development and rehabilitation priorities/ programmes of the
beneficiary countries;
 supporting local mine action organisations;
To assess the coordination among the EC and other agencies supporting mine action in a
country (regional; national; UN; donors; international NGOs; etc.);
To assess the impact of deconcentration on the planning and delivery of EC support to
mine action in the Middle East, including the capacity of EC delegations to assess proposals
for mine action projects and to monitor/evaluate the implementation of these projects;
To asses the adequacy of the EC national strategies and plans, and the effectiveness of
implementation;
To assess the existence of an ‘exit strategy’ for the country to graduate from donor
assistance (including plans for sustainability);
To assess the linkages between mine action and other issues, such as humanitarian
assistance, development, and armed violence reduction
To assess the impact of the end of the specific budget line for anti-personnel landmines and
the introduction of the new “stability instrument” on future mine action support from the
EC to the Middle East;
To make recommendations to improve the identification, design, and implementation of
EC-funded mine projects;

6

This question addresses, among other issues, the fact that “Commitment to the Mine Ban Treaty” is one of
the criteria listed in the EC Mine Action Strategy 2005-2007 for determining geographic allocations.
Page 2

•

To generate recommendations to enhance the opportunities for cross-fertilization among
mine action programs in the Middle East and globally.

TERMS OF REFERENCE
The full Terms of Reference (TORs) are attached as Appendix 1.
METHODOLOGY
The evaluation covered the period 2002 until today. Four countries in the region7 were selected of
which one could only be covered with a desk review because of security constraints: Iraq,
Lebanon, Jordan and Yemen.
The evaluation was implemented in three phases:
•
•
•

Planning, desk research and data collection in Brussels
Country missions to Yemen, Jordan, and Lebanon and in parallel interviews with EC
services, EU Member States, NGO HQ
Analysis and reporting

The Evaluation Team comprised Ralf Otto and Steinar Essen of Channel Research. The key
phases of the study were organized as follows:
Country
Yemen
Jordan
Interviews in Brussels
Lebanon

Timing
12 to 16 April
3 to 8 May
Mid April to end May
22 to 28 June8

Team Members
Steinar Essen
Steinar Essen
Ralf Otto
Ralf Otto and Steinar Essen

As the evaluation did not focus on the performance of individual projects, Evaluation Team
members spent most or all of their time in capitals and major centers for meetings and to collect
documents and data from:
•
•
•
•
•
•

EC delegations
national authorities and officials from national mine action centers
UN agencies supporting mine action
representatives from other major donors to mine action in that country
representatives from mine action operators (local and international)
other key government officials

Selected field visits were undertaken to the Nabatye area in South Lebanon, visiting FSD (Cluster
Bomb Unit (CBU) 276 and CBU 388) and MAG (CBU 390/391 and CBU 273) and Jordan,
visiting Royal Engineer Corps (REC) on the North Shunha Project (Jordan Valley).9
7

„Middle East“ is not defined as a region in the European Commission. Sometimes the term Near East is
used as well. Syria and Iran were not included in the ToR for this assignment.
The field visit to Lebanon was originally planned for May but had to be postponed because of security
concerns and the temporary blockade of the airport in Beirut.
9
Due to the security situation at the time of the field visit to Yemen it was not possible to visit project sites.
8
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Additional information was obtained from:
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•

Review of project documents (project proposals and contracts; mid-term and final reports,
as well as final evaluations, monitoring reports, etc., where available);
Interviews with relevant EC officials at Relex, Aidco, and DG ECHO (in Brussels);
Questionnaire survey with 20 questions and a ranking from (unimportant issue (1) to
extremely important issue (6); (the questionnaire survey was undertaken by GICHD)
Follow-up telephone interviews with project managers/implementers/recipients of EC
funds and projects, managers of operator organisations, both in organisations’ headquarters
and on the field, and beneficiary countries’ officials, etc.).
EC CSP and National Indicative Programs (NIP).
National Development Plans, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, and National Mine
Action Strategies from the four focus countries
Relevant documentation from the UN
Recent mine action evaluations commissioned by other agencies
The Internet
Other sources, as appropriate.

The evaluation team used the standard Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development/Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) evaluation criteria and where
appropriate the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian
Action (ALNAP) evaluation criteria for assessing humanitarian aid programs.10,11 An open
interview questionnaire was designed based on the evaluation criteria and further defined with
more detailed questions, which were adapted and updated throughout the evaluation process. This
questionnaire was also sent out by email either to be answered by an interlocutor or to form the
basis of an interview in person or by telephone.12 All together 64 persons were interviewed either
in person or by telephone.13
LIMITATIONS
The only significant constraint in this study was the limited availability of some EC officials for
interviews and the denial of access to some of the documentation. Whereas overall there was
interest in the study and generous support by those involved, the evaluators did not always get
access to documentation requested. In particular project documentation to the NGO funding in
Lebanon and Iraq could not be reviewed so that information from interviews and site visits
(possible in Lebanon only) could not be cross-checked. Requests from the evaluation team and
EC staff supporting this study remained unanswered.

10

http://www.oecd.org/document/22/0,3343,en_2649_34435_2086550_1_1_1_1,00.html
http://www.alnap.org/publications/eha_dac/index.htm
12
The questionnaire is attached in appendix.
13
A full list of persons interviewed is attached in appendix.
11
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2. GENERAL FINDINGS
OVERVIEW OF EC FUNDED MINE ACTIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST
The total amount of funding to MA in the Middle East is more or less the same in the two periods
that are covered by the two EC global MA strategies. The percentage of the total funding to MA
rose from 7% to 10% from the old strategy to the more recent one as is shown in the following
table:
Table 1 – Mine Action funding to the Middle East
Period

Total EC mine action
funding (Euro)
145.2 million
107.8 million

2002-2004
2005-2007

EC mine action funding
for Middle East (Euro)
10,374,260
10,831,684

% for Middle East
7%
10%

The constancy reflected in these figures is misleading, which is revealed by looking at the
individual countries and years in detail. It shows that the biggest part of the funding during the
2002 to 2004 period goes to Iraq in 2003 and is related to the emergency situation. There is no
funding to Yemen and Jordan during this period. In the following years the funding is more
diverse but does not include Iraq any more.
Table 2 – Funding per country & year14
EU funding in
mine action
in 2002

-

No of
projects
-

-

No of
projects
-

-

No of
projects
-

in 2003

9,870,000

8

-

-

-

-

in 2004

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

in 2005

-

-

-

-

800,000

1

-

-

800,000

in 2006

-

-

-

-

-

-

3,834,493

4

3,834,493

in 2007

-

-

2,000,000

1

3,066,749

4

5,066,749

in 2008

-

-

-

-

4,500,000

1

3,930,442

5

8,430,442

9,870,000

8

2,000,000

1

5,300,000

2

11,335,944

14

28,505,944

Total
2007

2002-

Total in percent
Related to
humanitarian
crisis
Percentage

Iraq

34.62%

Yemen

7.02%

Jordan

18,59%

Lebanon
504,260

No of
projects
-

Total
funding
-

1

10,374,260

39.77%

-

100%

9,870,000

8

-

-

-

-

10,831,684

13

20,701,684

100%

100%

-

-

-

-

95%

92%

72%

EC funding to MA in the Middle East varies from year to year and from country to country. It is
divided into two categories, funding in countries with a crisis (Iraq and Lebanon) and the two
other countries. The majority of funding goes to humanitarian demining in the crisis countries
(70%).
Only in Lebanon and Iraq the EC is funding NGOs directly. The background is the fact that Iraq

14

Additionally to the programs in the table one global advocacy program with a focus on the Middle East
was funded by the EC in 2003: “Engaging non-state armed groups in a landmine ban” for Colombia and
Middle East, implementing organisation: Geneva Call, amount 500.000, duration 36 months
(http://www.genevacall.org/home.htm)
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and Lebanon are countries with emergency situations where DG ECHO supports NGOs.15 Other
funding for MA in the region went entirely to UNDP, which is primarily funding state structures
but can also become involved in capacity building with NGOs (local).
Table 3 – Number of projects per partner & country
UNDP
MAG
FSD
HI-F
DCA
DDG
Intersos
NPA
Total

No of projects
5
5
2
4
3
2
1
1
22

No of countries
4 (Yemen, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq)
2 (Lebanon, Iraq)
1 (Lebanon)
2 (Lebanon, Iraq)
2 (Lebanon, Iraq)
1(Iraq)
1 (Iraq)
1 (Iraq)
4

EC MINE ACTION STRATEGY FOR THE MIDDLE EAST
There is no specific EC strategy for MA for the Middle East. EC CSPs for the individual
countries exist except for Iraq. Only in one country MA is mentioned in the CSP but, as will be
shown in the section about Lebanon, the decision to fund demining was taken first (following
humanitarian demining) and then MA was integrated into the CSP.
Table 4 – Is Mine Action mentioned in the EC Country Strategy Paper?
Mine Action mentioned in EC
Country Strategy Paper
Iraq
Yemen

Yes/no
n.a.
No

Jordan

No

Lebanon

Yes
No

Documents
No CSP
CSP 2002-2006, CSP 2007-2013, NIP 20052006, NIP 2007-2010
CSP 2008-2013, NIP 2005-2006, EC annual
reports and ENP report 2002, 2003, 2004
CSP 2007-2013 & NIP 2007-2010
CSP 2002-2006 & NIP 2002-2004
NIP 2005-2006

The country strategies cannot be seen as the strategic framework for funding to MA in the Middle
East. Consequently the only references regarding a strategy are the two EC global MA strategies
(2002-2004 and 2005-2007). The application of these strategies in the four countries is not
coherent. By looking at the priorities in these strategies and the funding decisions taken, it can be
shown that there is no stringent logic and that funding decisions cannot always be attributed to
strategic objectives (see appendix 4 for an overview).
This observation goes in line with the fact that the majority of EC officials interviewed during
this study declared that they were either not aware of the MA strategies or confirmed that they
did not use it as a reference for funding decisions.
This observation goes in line with the fact that a significant part of the funding in the region went
to humanitarian demining which is funded by DG ECHO. Within DG ECHO there is no specific
15

DG ECHO is strongly engaged in the Middle East. Funding is allocated to the West Bank and Gaza strip
and to Palestinian refugees living in Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. DG ECHO is also supporting Iraqi refugees
in the region – mostly to Syria and Jordan - and internally displaced within Iraq.
http://ec.europa.eu/delegations/deljor/en/eu_and_jordan/ECHO.htm
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strategy for humanitarian demining. The global MA strategy does refer to the humanitarian need
and the role of MA in humanitarian aid. However the strategy does not explicitly state objectives
and strategic priorities for humanitarian demining. There is no linkage in the strategy to DG
ECHO’s mandate or overall strategy.
During the period 2000 to 2006 the majority of the EC funded programs under the MA Budget
Line were still managed from Brussels (four out of six).16 The shift to the delegations took place
afterwards and today the majority of the funded MA programs are managed in the region (in
particular in Lebanon). Overall efficiency of the decentralization process was perceived as
positive.
REGIONAL APPROACH TO MINE ACTION
As stated above – and similar to findings from other regional EC MA evaluations – the EC does
not have a regional strategy or a regional approach to MA in the Middle East. As will be shown
in the country sections later, the countries have mine problems which can be addressed
nationally. National entities are entrusted with the task. They are usually closely linked to the
countries’ military.
Figure 1 – Funding allocation per country

The reasons for the existence of mines have in some cases regional implications (e.g. conflicts
with neighbours). The need to respond to the problems does in general not have regional
implications.17 However some aspects related to MA and the Middle East as a region could be
observed:
•
•
•

•

Regional budget lines exist (such as MEDA in the past)
EC Regional Strategies within ENPI today18 and regional cooperation
EC partly operates with a regional structure (e.g. Yemen was managed for a certain time
from Amman, the Jordan delegation includes a section for Iraq and a regional office for
ECHO, EC staff members have been shifted from Amman to Lebanon and EC staff
members travel to Amman regularly)
Jordan declared its intention to become regional actor in mine action

16

Only Yemen and Jordan were managed from delegations.
This study does not look at the root causes of the mine problematic or at any preventive or advocacy
measures taken or not taken by the EC. Although very interesting and important, these issues are beyond
the scope of this evaluation.
18
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/enpi_euromed_rsp_en.pdf; does not incl. MA
17
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These aspects can be seen as marginal compared to the fact that the MA problem can and should
be addressed nationally.
COORDINATION WITH EU MEMBER STATES
EU Members States fund MA programmes in the Middle East. If at all the coordination between
the EC and Member States regarding funding for MA in the Middle East takes place at national
level in the beneficiary countries (EC delegations, embassies).19 In the four countries no specific
coordination mechanism for MA exists between the EC and Member States. If coordination takes
place it happens within the overall donor coordination process (reconstruction, development).
MA specific coordination was perceived by interlocutors as weak.20 Funding is often channelled
through the UN and coordination is left to the UN and the national stakeholder.
At capital level Member States are consulted when it comes to development planning and the
drafting of CSP. This does not include MA or the involvement of MA expertise. There is no MA
specific coordination mechanism or procedure foreseen at capital level.
A number of Member States do have focal persons for MA in their governments (e.g. Denmark
and Germany). There is no structure or communication set up for these focal points to
communicate with the EC about MA. The focal points in Member States in Europe are not
involved in a coordination process when it comes to EC funding to MA in the Middle East and
there is generally not much awareness of EC funding to MA among Member States. EC funding
is seen as not very ‘visible’ and funding sources are difficult to identify, which makes it difficult
to follow for Member States.21
During interviews it was stated that there is no need to have a specific coordination mechanism
between the EU and Member States for MA globally. The APMBC gives the framework, sets the
goals and provides for a coordination structure. The UN is seen as the second coordinating body
for MA. Coordination in the MA sector is by some perceived as easy to achieve as there are few
actors. The country cases within this study however show that the level of coordination was
rather poor.
The wish to have a forum for exchange and information was expressed in all interviews with
Member States. Until 2006 there have been meetings regarding MA between the EU and Member
States but since the thematic budget line does no longer exist these meetings have been
suspended.
NON-GOVERNMENTAL IMPLEMENTING PARTNERS
In two of the four countries the EC funded international NGO partners directly (Lebanon and
Iraq). In Yemen, international NGOs are not active in clearance, but are in Mine Victim

19

According to the questionnaire to EC delegations donor coordination mechanisms exist and are useful (in
three countries assessed, excluding Iraq). In all three countries the existence and utility of donor
coordination mechanisms were ranked as important (4 on a scale of 6).
20
In the questionnaire the EC rated the importance of coordination between the EC and EU Member States
vis-à-vis MA with 5 (out of 6). In the other countries the importance of MA specific coordination for MA was
rated with 3 only.
21
This statement excludes DG ECHO funding to MA as DG ECHO follows a quite rigid visibility strategy. As
described earlier non-DG ECHO funding in the region goes to UNDP, thus only becomes ‘visible’ to other
donors if this funding comes to the knowledge of other donors.
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Assistance (MVA) whereas in Jordan international NGOs are active but not with EC funding.22
EC support to MA is not very visible in the Middle East and EC funding sources are difficult to
identify. DG ECHO is perceived as flexible and predictable for implementing partners. This is
less the case for other EC services. There is no focal point for NGOs regarding MA within the
EC.
NGOs in the field in general benefit from a person in the NGO HQ who is aware of EC
procedures and developments. NGOs with “EC experts” have a better knowledge of EC funding
procedures and decision making process. For these focal points it is easier to link up with DG
ECHO than with other EC services (to obtain information, to be aware of funding strategies and
priorities). This is partly because they are used to work with DG ECHO and partly because DG
ECHO’s procedures are perceived as clear and straight forward.
The reform process within the EC (and in particular decentralisation) is widely known to
implementing partners. However there is still very limited knowledge about new instruments
among NGOs (in particular knowledge of the Stability Instrument) and how funding procedures
work. NGOs are in any case aware of the increased importance of EC delegations.
The case of Lebanon showed consequences of this lack of knowledge of EC procedures. NGO
partners in the South were not aware of the potential funding gap that might occur at the end of
2008, in case the activities need to continue into 2009 (which is likely).23 NGO partners who
started working with DG ECHO funds have expectations regarding flexibility and speed of
decision taking based on ECHO procedures. The fact that other EC instruments are less flexible
and require longer decision making procedures, was not commonly known. NGOs working with
EC funds run a risk if they do not either discuss early on about duration of funding with the EC or
look out for funding alternatives (e.g. from Member States).24 The EC delegation on the other
hand did not have the knowledge of NGO partners and their way of working (e.g. dependence on
the EC as one donor) to raise the issue early enough.

22

Although no EC funding goes to NGOs in Jordan the questionnaire filled in by the EC ranks the
importance of the “Role & Performance of international MA NGOs receiving EC funding” with 5.
23
For details please see the following section on Lebanon.
24
National coordinating mechanisms (be it under the UN or be it within national structures) cannot
compensate for this as these institutions also do not have the specific background regarding EC procedures
and are therefore not in a position to foresee potential endings or gaps in EC funding.
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3. COUNTRY FINDINGS
LEBANON
CONTEXT
The situation in Lebanon in general and in the MA sector as well is characterized by instability.
Although still contaminated with an ‘old’ landmines problem the situation changed significantly
with the Israeli Lebanese conflict in summer 2006 and the new cluster munitions problem. The
international response to the MA problem can be divided into periods prior to the 2006 war and
after.
From the beginning of the civil war in 1975 until the end of the Israeli occupation in 2000 mines
and explosive ordnance were used extensively. In 2000 when Israel withdrew from South
Lebanon it left behind some 400,000 landmines. The 2003 LIS found 306 mine-impacted
communities affected by 933 mine and UXO contaminated sites over an estimated 137 square
kilometres of contaminated land.25
Prior to the conflict in July-August 2006, two
areas of South Lebanon were contaminated
with landmines and ERW: the area north of the
Litani River (so called area 6) and the Blue
Line bordering Israel. United Arab Emirates
(UAE) committed to clear remaining landmines
and booby-traps in Area 6. This will leave
South Lebanon mine-free, except for mines laid
along or adjacent to the Blue Line.
During the war between Israel and Hezbollah
from 12 July to 14 August 2006 about four
million cluster sub-munitions were fired on
Lebanon, of which an estimated one million did
not detonate.26
Despite numerous calls by the international community for information regarding the firing data,
Israel had not provided detailed strike information on the type, quantity and location of cluster
bombs dropped.27 The UN estimates that, in addition to cluster munitions, approximately 15,300
other items of UXO fell on the ground in South Lebanon. Accusations from Lebanon that Israel
had laid out mines during the 2006 conflict have been disputed.28
At the end of May 2007 fighting erupted between Fatah al-Islam and the Lebanese army in the
Palestinian Nahr al-Bared refugee camp in northern Lebanon. Fatah al-Islam is reported to have
booby-trapped buildings throughout the camp, in addition to laying unspecified mines and
roadside bombs.29
25

http://www.icbl.org/lm/2007/lebanon.html
Israel has admitted to firing only 1.2 million submunitions. http://www.icbl.org/lm/2007/lebanon.html
27
Some media sources reported that maps were exchanged at the occasion of the exchange of two dead
soldiers against prisoners in July 2008.
28
http://www.icbl.org/lm/2007/lebanon.html
29
“Lebanese Army Pounds Fighters at Refugee Camp,” Washington Post, 3 June 2007; “In fight against
militants, Lebanon bolstered by US, Gulf countries,” Christian Science Monitor, 4 June 2007.
26
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About 26 percent of the affected area in Lebanon is agricultural land.30 A recent study undertaken
by Landmine Action calculates the total costs due to cluster munitions contamination with US$
233,2 million (costs of lost agricultural production, cost of clearance and risk reduction activities,
cost of death and injuries).31 Only the international funding to establish and run the initial cluster
munitions response program in 2006 and 2007 is estimated at US$ 80 million.32 This significant
contribution from the government and international actors alone could not prevent serious losses
in South Lebanon which is borne mainly by individuals and their families.33
Regarding casualties it is difficult to obtain comprehensive data for Lebanon which can best be
shown by a quote from Landmine Monitor:
“Landmine Monitor has been unable to obtain reliable statistics on the number of
mine/ERW/IED casualties in 2006-2007 from stakeholders in Lebanon, due to the crisis
situation after the conflict; other factors appear to be lack of cooperation between
stakeholders, lack of verification and difficulties in providing casualty data by calendar
year.”34
The Lebanon Mine Action Centre (LMAC) gives figures, which state a total of 4.292 mine
victims since 1975 (1.876 killed, 2.416 injured). Casualties since 2006 are counted as 317 total
(41 killed and 276 injured).35
Figure 2 – Mine victims in Lebanon; 2000-08
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Besides numerous technical surveys and smaller studies, a number of comprehensive studies have
been undertaken to review the problem and the set up to address it. The LIS conducted in 20022003 by MAG was certified by UNMAS in 2004 and released in 2005.36 A review of the NDO
30

MACC SL presentation to Handicap International, Tyre, 19 March 2007 and Damage and Early Recovery
Needs Assessment of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, Food and Agriculture Organisation, November
2006
31
Counting the Cost, The economic impact of cluster munitions contamination in Lebanon, by Greg
Crowther, Landmine Action, May 2008, page 3
32
Counting the Cost, Page 5
33
“(…), this expenditure on cluster munitions clearance has not prevented direct economic impacts on the
population of southern Lebanon. This analysis suggest that between US$ 33 million and US$ 122 million in
economic losses will have been borne in this area as direct result of cluster munitions use.” Page 6
34
http://www.icbl.org/lm/2007/lebanon.html
35
Source: Presentation of Bgd. Gen. Mohamad Fehmi, slide 28
36
With funding contribution from the EC.
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MA program was undertaken by the GICHD in 2006. A comprehensive review of United Nations
Mine Action Service (UNMAS) activities in Lebanon found that the overall response was rapid
and effective, despite the lack of early contingency planning, and that the UN rapid response
framework was capable to address large, high-profile emergencies. Coordination was identified
as an area for improvement and increased focus on MRE was suggested.37
THE MINE ACTION PROGRAMME
The MA Sector in Lebanon is well established and more complex than in the other countries
regarded for this study. The Republic of Lebanon has not acceded to the APMBC. Its long-held
position has been that it is unable to join the treaty due to the continuing conflict with Israel.38
The country is divided into two zones because of the peacekeeping operations of the UN in the
south. Key actors are:
•

•

North of the Litani river:
o The Lebanese National Mine Action Authority (LNMAA, the inter-ministerial body
responsible for mine action policy)
o Lebanon Mine Action Center (LMAC) (former National Demining Office-NDO)
o UN Development Programme (UNDP)
o Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)
South of the Litani river
o Mine Action Coordination Center South Lebanon (MACC SL)
o UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS)39 parting support of the UN Force in Lebanon
(UNIFIL)
o Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)

LMAC, a part of the LAF, has the overall responsibility for implementing the MA policy and
strategy (mine free country by 2012), coordination, management and implementation of all MA
in Lebanon.
MACC SL provides needs assessments, planning, coordination and quality-assurance support to
MA operations in South Lebanon (below the Litani river), including UNIFIL’s area of operations.
In the south, MACC SL conducts accreditation on behalf of LMAC. MACC SL is a tripartite
structure comprising the UN, LAF and UAE representation. In May 2007 the LMAC requested
MACC SL to maintain its liaison function between UNIFIL and the LAF, to maintain its current
structure and to provide technical, operational and strategic advice to the LAF Engineering
Regiment and LMAC throughout 2008. UNMAS agreed that MACC SL would remain until the
end of 2008.
All humanitarian clearance in South Lebanon is coordinated through MACC SL. UNIFIL’s
existing demining unit became involved in humanitarian clearance after mid-2006, and several
countries sent troops to support humanitarian clearance. They went through the same

37

Evaluation findings in UNMAS, “Annual Report 2006,” New York, p. 47.
http://www.icbl.org/lm/2007/lebanon.html
39
UNMAS manages the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action (VTF). In 2006 37.1% of the
VTF were earmarked by donors for Lebanon. In 2006, 27 donors contributed a total of US$51,029,053 to
the VTF. The EC’s contribution was US$6,433,962. (UNMAS Brochure)
38
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accreditation process as the other operators.40 Up to 47 demining and battle area clearance teams
from seven countries were accredited by MACC SL.41
UNDP has supported the institutional development of the NDO (now LMAC), especially its
management capacity, through a chief technical advisor and a national MA program officer since
2003. In the period 2003 to 2006 UNDP worked with funding from DFID, Denmark and from its
own HQ schemes.42 From January to December 2007 UNDP was funded again from HQ schemes
and also from Sweden.
MRE in Lebanon is conducted by national and international NGOs, which considerably increased
their coverage in response to the 2006 war and the May Nahr al-Bared crisis in 2007. Local
NGOs with a network of 318 MRE activists, the World Rehabilitation Fund (WRF) and mine
clearance organisations provided MRE and community liaison, coordinated by LMAC.
International NGOs newly involved in MRE in Lebanon after the 2006 war were DanChurchAid,
Handicap International and INTERSOS.43 The Lebanon Mine Resource Centre (LMRC) at the
Faculty of Health Sciences of the University of Balamand provided training support. Norwegian
Peoples Aid (NPA), WRF and UNICEF continued to provide technical and financial support to
Mine Risk Education (MRE) in Lebanon.
The civil society and non-governmental disability sector is strong and provides services the
government is unable to provide: however, it relies heavily on international donor support.
EC SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION
The EC support as well as the support of most other international donors can be divided into pre
2006 and post 2006.44 After 2006 the funding to MA rose to amounts more than ten times higher
than before the war.45
EC funding prior to the 2006 crisis
The pre 2006 war period was covered by the CSP 2002-2006.46 The EC’s strategy was related to
the Barcelona process and mainly funded by the MEDA programme.47 Priority sectors were:
• support for economic reforms
• the promotion of social development and equilibrium to reduce income disparities and
alleviate poverty, and
• reduction of environmental degradation
40

According to MACC SL there are a total of 929 persons involved in EOD/BAC of which 872 are national
staff and 57 are international staff.
Several NGOs were involved in EOD and BAC in South Lebanon: Mines Advisory Group (MAG),
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), Handicap International (HI), the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD)
and DanChurchAid. The Swedish Rescue Services Agency (SRSA) conducted humanitarian clearance as
well as commercial companies including BACTEC, ArmorGroup and RONCO.
42
UNDP through its Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) allocates its resources through a
scheme called “Target for Resource Assignments from the Core” (TRAC). The TRAC scheme earmarks
55% of UNDP core resources for country programmes and projects.
43
INTERSOS did not receive EC funding.
44
An exception regarding international engagement are UAE which supported demining in Lebanon at a
high level over the last years-including before 2006.
45
Landmine Monitor identified donations of $68,845,934 (€54,800,553) for emergency and other mine
action, reported by 20 countries and the EC, compared to $6,300,000 provided by six countries and other
funding channels in 2005.
46
While the CSP refers to demining and is quite detailed on the reconstruction and development strategy,
there is no link between the two. NIP 2005-2006 confirms the adequacy of the CSP, but does not refer to
demining at all.
47
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed/index_en.htm
41
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•
•

development of human resources; and
the promotion of human and individual rights and cohesion between Lebanon's numerous
sectarian and religious groups.

The total amount of funds committed under MEDA I (1995-1999) for bilateral assistance was €
182 million, while under MEDA II (2000-2006) the total amount allocated was € 235 million.
Additionally ECHO made a significant contribution. In 2000 for example ECHO provided a grant
of 4.2 million for 12 NGO actions in health, physiological support for former prisoners, farming,
basic household support, schooling for children, handicap support (Palestinian refugee camps),
and humanitarian demining to alleviate the humanitarian consequences after the Israeli
withdrawal.
Activities related to demining were financed from non-MEDA and non-ECHO budget lines. A
Level One Mine Impact Survey and a humanitarian demining program were financed from the
rehabilitation budget line.48 Two grant contracts were signed with Mines Advisory Group in the
UK (MAG-UK) under the Rehabilitation Budget Line 2002-2004.
EC funding after the 2006 crisis
EC funding after the war in 2006 is characterized by the challenge to avoid gaps in funding MA
first, from humanitarian budget lines and, later, from ENPI funds. This was further complicated
by changing predictions for an end date for cluster munitions clearance in the south.
International funding for MA in Lebanon rose steeply in 2006 in response to the mine/UXO
contamination resulting from the war. A UN Flash Appeal and the international donor Stockholm
Conference for Lebanon’s Early Recovery in August 2006, in addition to bilateral funding
agreements, raised funds to respond to the crisis.
After the end of hostilities, the EC contributed to Lebanon € 107 million for the year 2006 at the
Stockholm conference. The EC has allocated a complementary € 30 million humanitarian aid
package for the populations affected by the conflict. Through DG ECHO, the EC provided
humanitarian and early recovery assistance to the returnee population and victims of the conflict.
Soon after the decision was taken it became evident that many of the needs were already
addressed by other donors and supporters from the region. The EC showed flexibility and as the
decision for funding was formulated broadly enough it became possible to finance humanitarian
demining. Operations funded focused on demarcation, awareness and clearance of unexploded
munitions, water and sanitation, shelter, and emergency health and food needs.
According to standard procedures DG ECHO launched a call for proposals and contracted four
international NGOs (FSD, HI-F, DCA, and MAG) of which two were already in the country and
two arrived because of the war.49 The operation started with 11 Battle Area Clearance (BAC)
teams (out of 16) under the coordination of MACC SL. For contractual reasons, the activities
could only start in January 2007, meaning that DG ECHO funded activities started significantly
later than the activities of NGOs with access to other funding as well (such as MAG with funding
from the UK). The delay is at odds with the humanitarian character of the activity.
The reason for the delay due to contract procedures was the fact that the ECHO emergency
decision did not include MA at the beginning as it was not possible to judge the scope of the
48
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19 08 05 Rehabilitation and reconstruction in favour of Mediterranean countries and Middle East
DG ECHO cannot fund LMAC or MACC SL directly as those are military entities.
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cluster munitions problem in summer 2006. DG ECHO showed flexibility and could fund MA in
the end; however, the final approval of the decision took until January. For those implementing
agencies which had to initiate MA in Lebanon from zero the start in January, this meant that
operations could only begin in spring 2007 after all administrative and logistic set ups were
arranged.50
When the 18 months maximum funding duration for DG ECHO contributions approached, the
government, the EC Delegation and the implementing partners looked for a solution to continue
funding as the contamination problem was not yet solved (end of 2007).
At the time of the conflict, the EC was negotiating the new CSP with the government of Lebanon.
The CSP for 2007-2013 became the first CSP for Lebanon under the European Neighbourhood
Policy (ENP).51 Its focus lies on immediate reconstruction, but also makes a link between the
reconstruction needs, the debt problem and conditions for medium-term structural reforms.52 A
total amount of € 187 million was allocated for the first NIP, covering the period 2007-2010, to
support these priorities with EU financial assistance from the European ENPI.53 In 2007 80% of
the total annual allocations and almost two thirds of the annual allocation for 2008 were directed
to securing the recovery reconstruction of the country.
As a consequence of the need to address the cluster problem in the South, the Lebanese
government requested that MA be added to the priorities of the CSP. A ‘last-minute’ change of
the already well-advanced CSP was possible.54 A budget line was shifted from support to private
sector development to MA. The CSP consequently includes MA as sub-priority 3 with a budget
of € 14 million.55 This sum was supposed to cover two years (€7 million per year). The first
tranche was scaled down to € 4 million when it became clear other donors were engaging as well.
Additional to the clearance activities, the EC started funding the UNDP, which provided
technical assistance to NDO and, today, to LMAC.
With these allocations in the CSP, continued funding to the MA implementing partners was
possible beyond February 2008. A ten-month contract was signed to continue the funding of
clearance teams up to the end of 2008, the end date that was predicted by MACC SL.56 Today the
end date is predicted for mid-2009 rather than end 2008. The EC allocated the funds for 2009 but
due to administrative procedures under the ENPI rules, the EC will not be able to spend this
money before autumn 2009 (or later). A funding gap will occur between end 2008 and until the
second tranche of the ENPI funds can be released.
The NGO partners (who came in under DG ECHO and who usually work under DG ECHO
procedures) are not aware of this potential funding gap and the administrative constraints at the
EC. The new demining programme is according to the EC – and as decided by LMAC in
50

One agency started clearance activities in April, which is 8 months after the conflict ended. According to
statistics from MACC SL the monthly victim rate dropped from 60 in August 2006 to 2 in February 2007 and
0 in March 2007.
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http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/country-cooperation/lebanon/lebanon_en.htm
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http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/lebanon/docs/index_en.htm
53
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/partners/enp_lebanon_en.htm
54
The ENP is a development tool. EC officials call the instrument “heavy” because of its long procedures
and the consultation process which it includes (e.g. Member States, EU Parliament). The fact that MA could
be integrated shows the commitment of those involved.
55
“Support for reconstruction and recovery – supporting economic and social recovery and reconstruction,
local development as well as demining and clearing unexploded ordnance.” Page 4 and 29
56
One of the implementing partners had to shift the contract from its Swiss entity to the French entity as
only the later was eligible for ENPI funding. Under DG ECHO funding this aspect was not of relevance. The
shift did not cause any difficulties in terms of administration or effectiveness.
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November 2007 – not supposed to work in the South. If ever the EC decides to work through
international NGOs, a new call of proposal has to be launched. Although there is regular
exchange between the NGO partners and the EC delegation57, this issue has not yet been
discussed clearly enough at the time of the field visit for this study58.
Lebanon is not mentioned in the indicative allocation in the global Mine Action Strategy of the
EU for 2005 to 2007 although the country is the only country covered by this study where MA is
mentioned in a CSP. The reason for this incoherence could be the fact that on the one hand the
country is not a signatory to the APMBC. On the other hand the CSP responds to the changing
environment in the region and here in particular to the conflict and the new contamination from
cluster munitions.
KEY ISSUES
Relevance
Overall the EC funding to Lebanon is relevant. The EC proved to be responsive to the situation
and to developments in the sector. On the other hand the EC funding is not following a long term
pro active strategic approach for MA support to Lebanon. The EC funded the MA sector only
sporadically before the 2006 crisis, increasingly after the crisis and with an open end date today.
The fluid situation in Lebanon makes a flexible approach necessary and the EC showed
flexibility and responsiveness in particular after the crisis in 2006. Nevertheless the weakness of
this re-active approach becomes clear today when prolonged funding to the sector and an exit
strategy require a more strategic and better planned approach. A more comprehensive view on the
MA problematic in Lebanon and even more flexible instruments might have allowed the EC to
avoid some difficulties that occur today or might occur in the near future. Efficiency might have
increased with better planning and the integration of humanitarian demining into the national
response to the contamination problem might have been possible.
In line with other donors, the EC did not pay much attention to the mine problem in Lebanon
before the 2006 crisis although this existed and still exists today. The EC then contributed to the
scaling up of capacities for cluster munitions clearance in the south and of technical assistance to
the national framework. Today the EC is faced with the challenge of deciding how to finance the
capacities created and supported after the 2006 crisis, without having a clear concept or an exit
strategy at hand. A more strategic approach from the beginning and a continuous focus on MA
based on needs and integrated in national programs as foreseen by the EC global strategy might
have prevented this.
To integrate humanitarian demining into the national framework and to make the link with other
MA activities in Lebanon is a challenge. The fact that the predicted end date for the cluster
clearance has been changed twice has not made it easier to have a plan for the EC and other
donors. A number of factors contributed to the fact that the EC intervention did not link with the
national framework for MA and did not achieve a smooth crossover from the different phases of
the response (development context before 2006-crisis in 2006-humanitarian intervention in 2006
and 2007- and finally reconstruction):
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Three programs were visited, at least once during the last 10 months.
All the NGO were according to the EC informed that the new decision would start not before end of
2009.
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•

•

•

•

The EC intervention followed standard procedures (DG ECHO procedures for
humanitarian action and EuropeAid procedures for reconstruction and development aid)
which, on the one hand, could be used flexibly to make funding possible but, on the other
hand, prevented the EC from looking beyond their intervention and planning more
strategically.
EC procedures limit decision-makers so that some funding options are not possible (e.g.
not possible to fund MACC SL/UNMAS as part of the peacekeeping forces in the south,
not possible to fund LMAC directly as it is part of the military)
EC ‘standard approach’ is not always adapted to the local situation (e.g. call for proposal
and contracting a variety of NGOs, some of which need to start operations from zero,
causing significant delays)
Lack of awareness of MA specific problématique (e.g. lack of awareness of the costs
related to setting up clearance teams; ideas to support local NGOs as part of a LRRD
strategy, although MA in Lebanon – as in some other countries – is based on military or
other state structures)

Another example of the missing strategic approach is the funding to UNDP, whose program
started in 2003 but was funded by the EC in 2008 only. Funding includes components which are
not fully thought through or based on a national EC strategy for the sector (e.g. the capacity
building component of two local NGOs for MA).
Efficiency
Regarding the choice of funding channels, the EC was following administrative imperatives more
than taking strategic decisions. To support the national framework, the EC had to fund through an
intermediary (here UNDP) as NDO or LMAC were assessed as too weak in terms of capacity to
procure and contract according to EC rules. For the funding of clearance activities DG ECHO
had to launch a call for proposals as direct funding to military entities such as LMAC or MACC
SL was not possible. Later the EC Delegation ‘inherited’ the NGO projects and started funding
LMAC through UNDP.59
The decision of DG ECHO to fund four international NGOs in 2006 and 2007 instead of one or
two is questionable in terms of efficiency and integration into longer term planning. Arguments
such as diversity and limited capacity of the two NGOs already active in the country are
outweighed by arguments against this set up.60 Each NGO partner had to establish administrative
and logistical structures, with all related costs. Demining activities are cost intensive as
specialized equipment is needed, which is not the case for some other humanitarian interventions
such as food aid distribution. Two ECHO funded NGOs came to Lebanon only for these projects
and had to start operations from zero. Two of the NGOs only work with EC funds and might have
difficulties obtaining access to other donor funding in case gaps in EC funding occur.
With a clearer strategic vision and planning for an exit, the decision to support four NGOs might
have been avoided. Already today, some of the capacities built up with EC funding are lying idle
(e.g. ambulances of one NGO partner and purchased with EC funds are not in use anymore but
are parked in the courtyard of this NGO.
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The fact that the EC first cannot, but later can fund the military shows how absurd the funding restrictions
under some of the EC budget lines are: also, the fact that the EC supports UNMAS at the global level, which
managed MACC SL prior to, during and after the summer 2006 conflict.
60
The limited capacity of the two existing NGOs – as reported by one interlocutor – was not confirmed
during interviews with the NGOs. but the question could not be assessed further during this study.
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Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development
The missing strategic vision and planning for an exit strategy also becomes relevant when it
comes to Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD). Although the MA
intervention after the 2006 crisis is without doubt relevant and is contributing to reducing
suffering, there is no real link between the MA funding and the recovery or reconstruction
process. The activities for humanitarian demining appear isolated and are not aligned with other
EC funded programs.
The linkage between clearance activities and other reconstruction programs is limited to the fact
that agriculture in the clearance areas is an important source of income in the contaminated areas.
The linkage between MA and development was rated as very important (5 out of 6) in the EC
questionnaire. As shown in the box below the concept of LRRD is a complex one and requires
coordination and planning if the linkage between relief, rehabilitation and development is to
emerge.
Under the ad hoc decision for humanitarian aid in Lebanon € 30 million were allocated for
programs in the following six areas:61
• Humanitarian demining
• Psychosocial activities
• Livelihood sector
• Shelter
• Specific winter assistance
• Water and sanitation
• Coordination and protection
These activities are implemented by a wide range of UN agencies and NGOs. In the MA sector
only DanChurchAid is involved in activities that are not clearance (MRE). DanChurchAid is also
the only MA NGO involved in other emergency activities (component winter support:
distribution of diapers, blankets, heater and fuel supply). Otherwise the MA activities are rather
isolated from other assistance activities. Regardless these parallel structures the EC seems to be
contented with the linkage.62
Textbox 1 – The EU Policy on Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD)
The concept of LRRD originates from the 1980s in response to concerns about the “grey zone”
between humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation, and development. The instruments and
working methods used in these different types of assistance programmes differ in time frames,
implementing partners, the role of national authorities, and the content of interventions.
In 1996, the EC developed a basic rationale for LRRD.* It was acknowledged that short-term
relief mechanisms do not and, in some cases, cannot systematically take into account long-term
development issues. At the same time, development policy should better assist countries to deal
with natural disasters, conflicts and other crises. These deficiencies could be reduced if relief
and development were appropriately linked, which is not simply a matter of ensuring a smooth
transition from emergency to development assistance; rather, it includes disaster preparedness
and preventing/resolving conflicts.
There is no unique model for LRRD. Broad recommendations include: improved donor
coordination; adjustment of the EU’s own instruments, working methods and internal
61
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Decision 2006/03000
See comments in EC questionnaire.
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mechanisms; avoiding parallel structures for relief and development in a country; and clarifying
who is responsible for what.
Demining is mentioned in various contexts in the LRRD documents,** which stress the need to
integrate MA into post-conflict planning and the wider development context.
In theory, LRRD can be promoted within EC Country Strategy Papers (CSP), which analyse all
aid-relevant aspects in a country and outline a five year plan (indicative programme). The plan
includes aid provided through all EU mechanisms including the EDF, thematic budget lines,
ECHO, and the Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM).
* Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on Linking Relief, Rehabilitation
and Development (LRRD), COM (1996) 153 final of 30.04.1996. See also, Communication from the Commission to the
Council and the European Parliament: Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development – An assessment, COM (2001)
153 final of 23.04.2001
** In the 1996 document under a separate paragraph “The particular case of anti-personnel mines” (p. 8), and as
instrument reacting in post-conflict situations (p. 19). The 2001 document also mentions demining under post-conflict
situation needs (p. 7), and a separate paragraph on demining stresses the importance of integrating demining within the
CSPs (p. 19).

Coordination
Finally, the coordination of donor activities regarding MA in Lebanon is very week. MACC SL is
seen as the coordinating body for the activities in the south and UNDP for the rest of the country.
But donors do not coordinate at the national level, nor on their support to MACC SL or UNDP.
National interests and procedural constraints dominate the coordination imperatives among
donors. Donors rely on UNDP and LMAC and their capacity to plan and coordinate. At no point
has the capacity of the two organizations been assessed systematically; the EC as a donor does
maintain contact with both, but not at a level to assess the capacity.
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JORDAN
CONTEXT
Jordan has a landmines problem since the 1940s. Mines were laid out in 1948 at the partition of
Palestine, then during the Arab-Israeli war 1967-1969, and finally during the civil war in 1970.
Minefields are located in the northern area bordering Syria, the Jordan Valley and Wadi Araba.
Based on military estimates, there were about 305 000 mines laid on Jordan territory, of which
73,000 were Israeli and 232,000 Jordanian. The entire minefield along the Syrian border was laid
by Jordanian army and is mapped. Both Jordan and Israel laid mines along the border between
the two countries. Israel has handed over the mine location maps to the Jordanian authorities.
Landmines in Jordan are located in the military-controlled border areas, and are marked, mapped
and partly fenced today.
Since 1993, when humanitarian demining began,
more than 101,000 mines have been removed and
25 million m2 cleared, representing 183 of the 497
minefields.63 Today, all known minefields along
the Israel/Jordan border are cleared. The remaining
problem is the 100 km long and approximately 100
m wide minefield along the Syrian border.
Challenges to clearance are the climatic condition
(heat), desert sand that buries the mines deeply,
and flooding that has shifted the position of mines
and buried others down to 1.5 meters. In addition
to clearance, a permanent fence will be
constructed. As a side effect this fence is expected
to reduce smuggling (which is a problem on routes
established through the mine fields).
According to the findings of the Jordan retrofit survey (an “LIS light” survey) about 500,000
people or 8% of the population are affected by mines. The landmine problem has a direct impact
on the population (however few accidents occur) and affects their agricultural activities. There
are no solid figures on the numbers of accidents, but it is estimated there have been between 500
and 800 since the 1960s. Rehabilitation services have been available for mine victims since the
late 1960s. These services include the provision of prosthetics and reintegration into work.64
Agricultural lands remain uncultivated, irrigation and hydro projects delayed and historical and
world cultural heritage sites unexplored. Jordan has a high level of poverty and unemployment.65
The agricultural sector accounts for 3.5 percent of the country’s GDP.66
THE MINE ACTION PROGRAMME
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan actively pursues the resolution of its landmine problem.
Jordan signed and ratified the Ottawa Treaty in 1998. It came into force in May 1999 and hence
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http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/about-the-fco/country-profiles/middle-east-north-africa/jordan?profile=all
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Industry: 10.3%, services: 86.2% (2007 est.); https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/jo.html
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the completion deadline under Article 5 of the APMBC is May 2009. In compliance with Article
4 of the convention, Jordan completed its destruction of stockpiles of anti-personnel landmines in
2003. The civilian-led National Demining and Rehabilitation Committee (NDRC) was
established by royal decrees issued in 2000 and 2002.67 In June 2005, the five-year national MA
plan was launched by the NDRC.68 Its goals are to:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Develop mine clearance capacity;
Develop a database to support all aspects of MA;
Develop a coherent national survivor and victim assistance program;
Launch nationally coordinated mine risk education;
Undertake advocacy for universalisation of the Mine Ban Treaty; and,
Develop the NCDR’s capacity to manage all aspects of the MA program.

The government’s engagement in the landmine cause is also reflected in a number of activities
such as hosting the Eighth Meeting of States Parties to the APMBC in November 2007. Jordan
became co-chair of the Standing Committee for Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine
Action Technologies in December 2005.
NCDR, as the executing agency, has the overall responsibility for the effective management and
execution of MA in Jordan. NCDR ensures that project outcomes and outputs are achieved and
reported adequately through periodic reports from the operators. It is accountable for outputs and
achievements of project objectives. It jointly approves project work plans and activities with the
UNDP.
The two main executing actors in mine clearance in Jordan today are the REC and Norwegian
People’s Aid (NPA). NPA became the sole implementing partner for NCDR, which allows for
good supervision and easy coordination. The REC has done all the clearance in the Jordan
Valley, an area that will be declared free of all known mine fields by the end of 2008. REC will
then focus its resources on constructing a new fence along the Syrian border simultaneously with
NPA mine clearance activities along the border.
To accelerate mine clearance in efforts to meet its Article 5 deadline, Jordan decided that NPA
should start clearance operations in 2006. Clearance was previously carried out by army
engineers only. REC, as the national capacity, will continue to respond to reports of single mines
(it is still a problem with mines washed into the Jordan Valley (riverbed) on Jordan territory from
the minefields on the Israel side of the river). REC has also been the main supplier of experienced
staff to NCDR.
UNDP works with NCDR at the strategy/policy level and supports NCDR in donor relations.
Most of the funding to MA is now channelled through UNDP. UNDP employs a full time project
manager to administrate a grant from the EC. A CTA position is funded by Norway.
EC SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION
The EU is a long-standing partner of Jordan and aims use a range of instruments, including
financial assistance, to build on past co-operation in support of Jordan’s reform plans. Jordan was
one of the first countries to sign an Association Agreement (AA) and is among the five countries
which have expressed an interest in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and have adopted
67

http://ncdr.org.jo/
http://ncdr.org.jo/aboutus.php?$mainlink=About_Us&$contentlink=About_Us; the plan has a budget of
US$47.79 million for the five years. A strategy and annual plan for mine risk education was agreed as well.
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a three-year ENP Action Plan in 2005. A total amount of € 265 million will be allocated for the
first NIP, covering 2007-2010. The priority areas are political reform and good governance, trade
and investment development, sustainability of the development process, institution building,
financial stability and support to regulatory reform.
National governments and the EC reported contributing US$1,464,826 for MA in Jordan in 2005,
a decrease from 2004.69 The EC donated € 800.000 through UNDP to the NCDR for technical
survey, demining and training of deminers.70 The funding covers 75% of the overall costs of the
action. Funding is for the period from late December 2005 to end 2007, and was completed by
June 2008. 71,72 Funding to UNDP was earmarked for clearance. The decision on funding was
taken in Brussels.
The objectives of the UNDP funded programme (called The North Shunah Mine Clearance
Project) were to:
o
o
o
o
o

Develop and train on National Mine Action Standards and Quality Assurance
Procure Mine Clearance Equipment & Spares
Technically Survey contaminated areas
Support Mixed Mine Clearance (Manual & Mechanical)
Undertake Quality Assurance & Quality Control

The EC monitors the programme in a limited way, focusing on administrative and financial
control (financial reporting and auditing). All technical aspects are left to UNDP and NCDR.
KEY ISSUES
Relevance
EC funding of MA in Jordan is highly relevant. Both politically (APMBC obligations and
relation to its neighbouring countries) and economically (the mine fields are mostly in fertile
areas – a scarce resource in Jordan) the mine clearance operation is important.
Jordan has today managed to secure from its own budget and from external sources the funds
needed to end the landmine problem. With the three year extension request, Jordan should be able
to declare itself free of all known mined areas within its jurisdiction by 2012. Jordan has
impressive statistics regarding the number of mines destroyed, the areas released and the related
cost-effectiveness ratio. By funding MA in Jordan, the EC is contributing to this process.
MA is not mentioned in any of the EU strategy or planning documents for Jordan.73 The EC
global MA strategy has not been used as the basis for designing the EU funded programme in the
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http://www.icbl.org/lm/country/jordan
The sources of the funding remained unclear. Some stated that funding came from the thematic budget
line for MA. Other said it was taken from a budget line for the development of the agricultural sector in
Jordan.
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A new contract has been signed in May 2008 for the clearance of the Northern border to Syria (€ 4,5 mill
over 24 months-ENPI/2008/154932)). The initiative for this funding originates from Brussels and the
lobbying of Prince Mired of NCDR for funding the MA activities in Jordan.
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http://www.undpjordan.org/UNDPinJordan/WhatWeDo/CrisisPreventionandRecovery/MineAction/tabid/121/Default.aspx
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The CSP 2007-2013 including the NIP; the NIP 2005-2006; EC annual reports; and the ENP reports for
2002, 2003, 2004 do not include a reference to MA.
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reporting period covered. The fact that the EU is supporting MA in Jordan stems from the
government’s engagement in the APMBC and from good personal contacts.
The positive impact of MA is relatively clear – removal of a permanent threat to life and
development. The EC has channelled all its funds to clearance and nothing to the other pillars of
MA. This is the right choice as MRE/VA is of limited need in Jordan if the threat is eliminated
reasonably fast. Additionally, VA is covered by royal charities.
Effectiveness and Efficiency
So far as could be assessed during the field visit, the Northern Shauna project ending in 2008 has
met all its objectives. The project focused on clearance of 12 minefields in the Jordan Valley.
These, and three other minefields, were cleared within the framework of the project.
NCDR has become a competent organisation. This is mainly due to its positive attitude towards
new ideas and its capability to combine the experience of REC and NPA. NCDR has a
comprehensive and qualified QA/monitoring capacity to oversee REC and NPA in the field. By
funding NCDR through UNDP, the EC is contributing to these achievements.
It is too early to assess the effectiveness of the new grant of € 4,5 million signed in early May
2008. However, the process leading to the signature was said to be unsatisfactory for the partners
(UNDP, NCDR) and other donors involved. It was reported that the EC was not communicating
clearly on the decision making process, so that for some time it was uncertain whether continuing
funding was possible or not. The risk of a funding gap or double funding from other donors
became an issue.
NCDR, through REC and NPA, has introduced innovative methods to make MA cost efficient.
NCDR has also adapted the “land release concept” that allows for a rapid release of land and
ensure mine clearance assets are focused on areas with a confirmed presence of mines. It was a
vital decision to take if Jordan wanted to become mine free within reasonable time. NCDR chose
an NGO as a partner instead of building on REC or developing its own clearance asset such as is
the case in Yemen.
By contributing to NCDR, the EC has shared in this process. However, EC support is provided
indirectly through UNDP, which influences efficiency. The set up implies, for example,
additional management costs (in-country and at the HQ level). The EC monitored the project
only at an administrative level (reporting according to EC regulations). On the operational and
technical side, the EC was not engaged.
UNDP is perceived to have the competence and experience to oversee and administer the funds.
UNDP has a competent MA technical advisor in country, who plays a key role in fundraising,
capacity building, coordination and overall quality assurance. The UNDP TA is an important
“negotiator/facilitator” between (international) operators and national authorities.
NCDR hosts regular donor meetings, but these seem more an information/fundraising event
where all current/potential donor countries are invited. These meetings are less an arena for
discussions or dialogue, and no minutes are taken. Currently there is very little coordination
among the donors.
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Sustainability and Link to Development
Neither in any of the EC strategy papers for Jordan nor in the project document with the UNDP
project is there any direct link between MA and the development process. Without going into
detail, the grant application refers to socio-economic development and regional peace building
benefits, which are viewed as being substantial. The longer term impact of the project appears to
be highly tangible as the land and water resources that will be freed through the project will be
put into productive use immediately, thereby contributing to the Government’s national poverty
reduction strategy and it’s Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).
The programme itself however is limited to the clearance activities and on capacity development
of the counterpart. The project does not foresee any activities directly related to the use for the
land, neither has a linkage to another initiative that would bridge to a follow-up.
Regarding the capacity development component, there will be no need to have a large national
capacity once the clearance of the northern border is done. Jordan will be “mine free” and the
REC is more than capable to deal with single devices that will be discovered in the years to come
(e.g. Israeli mines that cross the border with flooding).
NCDR and the GoJ have the vision to establish a regional MA capacity. There is already a plan
and a dialogue established with GICHD and James Madison University (USA) to establish a
training centre in Jordan. The purpose is, for example, to undertake mid-management courses for
MA personnel in the Middle East. It remains to be seen how far this plan and the activities take
off.
Coherence and Coordination
NPA is the sole operator and NCDR will do the QA/QC of the operations. The key staff within
NPA (national programme manager, senior technical advisor, operational coordinator,
international relations) are all ex NCDR – ensuring a transparent and good dialogue between
NPA and NCDR. In theory, this is a straightforward task with only one objective – clearance of
all the mines within the treaty deadline.
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YEMEN
CONTEXT
As a result of several conflicts, including the 1962-1975 war in the north between republicans
and royalists, the 1963-1967 war of independence in the south, the 1970-1983 war against leftwing guerrillas and the 1994 Separatist War, Yemen is contaminated with both antipersonnel and
anti-vehicle mines and other ERW. Most landmines were laid in pre-unification border areas
between northern and southern Yemen.74
A Landmine Impact Survey conducted in 2000
serves as the primary source of information for
MA planning.
According to this survey, 592 communities
were affected by landmines (1078 suspected
hazard areas) covering an area of approx 923
km2 directly affecting approx 6% of the
population (14 communities with a population
of approximately 36,000 with high impact and
578 communities with a population of 791,400
seen as medium to low impact). By June 2007,
419 km2 remained to be cleared.75
The scope of the problem has been reduced since the finalisation of the 2000 LIS project through
a combination of clearance and technical survey (area reduction and cancellation). However
casualties continued to occur in 2007, and at a higher rate than in 2006. In 2007 there were said to
be four to six new casualties per month (48-72 annually) but there is some uncertainty about
figures of casualties so that the total number of mine/UXO casualties today and over the past
years is not known.76 A recent report by YEMAC speaks of 5,000 casualties over the past 10
years.77
In 2006, a livelihoods analysis of mine-affected communities in Yemen was undertaken.
According to the study “landmines and ERW have an impact on infrastructure development,
which is denying people access to economic opportunities.”78 The blockage of agricultural lands,
irrigation sources and grazing areas results in economic losses. Only 2.6% of Yemen’s land is
arable.
THE MINE ACTION PROGRAM
The Government of Yemen is committed to eliminate the impact of mines and UXO in Yemen.
The National Mine Action Committee (NMAC-established in 1998) oversees the Yemen
Executive Mine Action Centre (YEMAC), which is in charge of implementing the plans and
policies approved by NMAC.
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The Republic of Yemen signed the APMBC on December 1997 and it entered into force on 1
March 1999.79 Yemen’s National Mine Action Strategic Plan initially covered the period 20012005. Based on a LIS it was revised in June 2004 to cover the period 2004-2009. The plan’s
vision is to “put an end to the suffering of the people and the casualties caused by antipersonnel
mines in mine-affected areas by the end of March 2009.”80 This year however Yemen has asked
for a six year extension. Although called “one of the best demining programs in the world”, the
program faced some financial and technical obstacles. Repeatedly the program has had funding
shortfalls (e.g. in 2003 and again in 2005). According to YEMAC for example in 2005 the total
amount to implement the activities was USD 3,500,000 of which Yemen received only USD
1,800,000.81 Technical obstacles are for example the fact that many mines are laid out in
mountainous areas and Yemen still lacks the appropriate demining technology to deal with
magnetic and iron soils.
The planned budget for the period 2009 is USD 31,216,667 of which USD 10,495,000 is planned
82
as donor contributions.
In compliance with the Mine Ban Treaty, Yemen destroyed all stockpile antipersonnel landmines
on 27 April 2002 and developed and enforced landmine legislation in the country since January
2005.
Mine clearance in Yemen is undertaken solely by YEMAC involving staff seconded from the
Engineering Department of the Ministry of Defence. Since the establishment of the abovementioned institutions, the Government of Yemen has seconded about 1.000 military personnel
as deminers and other operational staff in support of MA activities nationwide. Yemen provides
USD 3,500,000 per year since 1999 to cover salaries, insurance, social security, compensation
and field allowances, food, and premises.83
YEMAC has adopted a “cluster clearance approach”. The focus is on communities clustered
close to each other, no matter whether they are high impact communities or medium and lowimpact communities.
With support of UNDP, Yemen capacities and human resources has been established and trained
to international recognised standard. MA in Yemen is now undertaken with no international
advisors and there is national ownership to the program.
The Yemeni Landmine/UXO Victim Assistance Program was established in 1999 as an integral
part of YEMAC. The Mid-Term Evaluation of YEMAC Phase II found this Program to be “one
of the most advanced in the world”, with some 1200 victims having been identified and 286
treated medically between 2001 and 2005.84 According to a recent study there are nevertheless
some doubts regarding the program’s coverage, which to date is limited. Very few of the
survivors had received significant help apart from emergency medical care.85
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There are two local NGOs involved in MA: Yemen Association for Landmines Survivors and
Yemen Mine Awareness Association. Both are working under YEMAC coordination.
EC SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION
The direct EC support to MA in Yemen is limited to the funding of a UNDP programme, which
has been running since 1999. The EC supports Phase III of the programme (“Support to eliminate
the impact from mines and ERW in Yemen”).86 It was signed within the MAP Annual Work
Program for 2006 and the corresponding call for proposals.87
The UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) executed the first phase of the project from 1999 to
2003. During this phase the first UN certified LIS was completed, the above-mentioned FiveYear Strategic Mine Action Plan was developed, Mine Clearance Units and Technical Survey
Teams created and trained, highly mine impacted communities cleared and mine awareness
activities implemented.
During the second phase from October 2003 until the end of 2006, which was later extended to
2007, the capacity building process as well as clearance and MRE continued.
An evaluation of YMAP was carried out in 2001. In 2002 the UNDP Mine Action Team
conducted an assessment of the status of the program and in 2005 UNDP undertook a mid-term
evaluation. Results of the assessments were positive overall.
Phase three focuses on Yemen having a fully national MA program, with UNDP providing only
modest support, mainly resource mobilization. The last UNDP chief technical advisor left Yemen
in August 2006, although a programme officer remains within the UNDP Yemen office.
The decision to fund this MA activity in Yemen was taken in Brussels with the involvement of
the EC delegation in Amman which was overseeing the EC office in Yemen at the time. The
contract was given directly to UNDP without a call for proposals as there are no eligible
alternatives in Yemen.
KEY ISSUES
Baseline data and estimation of end date
In Yemen the government, donors and operators have, as in a number of other countries, based
their estimation of the size (extent) of the mine problem on the findings from a LIS (the scope of
the problem were estimated to 923 km2). However, a known weakness with the LIS approach is
that it overestimates the mine problem as non-technical people are tasked to estimate the size of a
suspect hazard area.
In Yemen there was a need to follow up the LIS with a technical survey. The nationwide
technical survey finished in 2008 has lead to a reduction of the original suspect hazard areas to
less than 10% of original size. The approach to base initial funding on LIS is appropriate.
However the example of Yemen shows that the LIS only gives an indication of the impact of
mines (at the time of the survey), but limited knowledge of the physical extent of the problem.
Promotion and funding of technical surveys is important for national authorities and donors.
Without a comprehensive/nation-wide technical survey the scope of the problem will remain
unknown and end date will be at best a qualified guess. The same weakness in baseline data
86
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applies for the number of casualties occurred during the last ten years.
Prioritisation
There has been no EC funding for MA in Yemen prior to 2007 although the situation in Yemen
was eligible under the EC strategy for MA for 2002-2004. Yemen fell under both the thematic
(elimination of AP Landmine/UXO threat and the alleviation of its effects and creation and
reinforcement of local capacity and MA efficiency and effectiveness) and the geographic
priorities of the strategy (country severely to moderately affected by APL/UXO problem;
prioritization of the problem within the national framework). On the other hand Yemen is not as
strategically important for the EU as other countries in the region.88 The MA sector also has to
“compete” with other sectors in Yemen as poverty and the need for support is big. The EC
decided to prioritize the health sector.
Mainstreaming
MRE and VA are pillars of MA in Yemen (Strategic Objective Three in the UNDP Program
Phase III). There is a potential for mainstreaming and integration into already existing national
structures or other development projects. Regarding prioritisation, the EC in its country strategy
for Yemen has made the choice to put an emphasis on the health sector. The health sector in
Yemen is established and there is potential for better integrating care for mine survivors. MRE
could be better integrated into school curriculum or transferred to existing NGOs already
established without the need of international funds.
The EC is funding other sectors in Yemen and contributes to the reduction of poverty, but there is
no linkage between this funding and the funding to MA. The support to MA in Yemen is isolated
from other EC funding to Yemen. MA is not mentioned in any of the CSP or NIP covering the
evaluation period.89 DG ECHO is implementing a humanitarian program covering the health
sector, refugees, social support, water & sanitation. Again there is no link to MA.
Donor coordination and monitoring
Currently there is virtually no coordination among donors regarding MA and limited interaction
between donors and YEMAC or NMAC.90 One of the reasons for this is the funding channel,
which goes via UNDP in New York. Most contracts are negotiated from capitals and the funds
are mainly thematic funds/earmarked MA budget lines. There is no or very limited knowledge of
the MA programme at the embassy level (including the EC delegation). Embassies in Yemen do
not feel responsible for the programme and are confident in UNDP’s capabilities to oversee the
programme in an appropriate manner. UNDP approves the project and work plan, ensures
appropriate project appraisal and capacity assessment, coordinates auditing process, monitoring,
evaluation and validation, and ensures financial and substantive oversight.
Donor funding to MA in Yemen is handled from distance and characterized by good national
ownership. However the development of mine clearance still needs attention and with the current
clearance rate and delays
YEMAC has sent forward an extension request based on extensive international funding to
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Criteria according to the EC MA strategy are proximity to EU or the political context. In the region Yemen
has to “compete” with Iraq and Iran for attention.
89
CSP 2002-2006, CSP 2007-2013, NIP 2005-2006, NIP 2007-2010
90
Bilateral donors supported the mine action programme such as the governments of the US, Italy, France,
Belgium, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, UK, Canada, Germany, Sweden and Switzerland.
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finalise within a six year timeframe. However, it is clear that the donors have not been engaged in
the development of the extension request or committed funds for the coming years.
IRAQ
CONTEXT
Iraq is one of the countries most severely affected by landmines and ERW as a result of internal
conflicts, the war with Iran, the first Gulf War, and the conflict that began in 2003. Since the
2003 invasion, almost daily attacks with car bombs or other improvised explosive devices,
targeted at civilians, the military and police, and at the Coalition Forces indicate that huge
amounts of abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) were left unsecured after the overthrow of the
Saddam Hussein regime and subsequently, plundered, for use ongoing insurgencies.
Although there have been several mine/ERW
contamination surveys, the Iraq LIS (partly funded
by the EC) is the first comprehensive national
survey of mine/UXO contamination. The data
collection started in 2004 and ended in April 2006
and includes 13 of Iraq’s 18 governorates.
According to the LIS there is mine/ERW
contamination in the southern region (854.5 km2),
the south-centre region (87.6 km2) and in the
northern region (776 km2).91
Types of contamination and impact vary significantly
between the regions. The Kurdistan region, comprising the governorates of Erbil, Dahuk and
Sulaymaniyah, is one of the most seriously mine-contaminated areas in the world. It has 1,428
affected communities and contends with thousands of tactical minefields on the borders with Iran
and Turkey.
There is further mine contamination along the Green Line, the former frontline between Kurdish
forces and Saddam Hussein’s army, as well as UXO across all three governorates. South-central
Iraq and the southern governorates of Basra, Thi Qar and Missan also have minefields on the
border with Iran from the 1980-1988 war.
Cluster munitions and unexploded air and ground ordnance used by Coalition Forces in their
advance on Baghdad, together with huge quantities of ordnance abandoned by the Iraqi army,
have been the major cause of casualties.92 Recent studies have reported at least 800,000 metric
tons of unexploded ordnance (UXO) in and around Basra; this is mainly unused munitions;
bombs, rockets and mortars discarded by fleeing Iraqi troops.93
There are no comprehensive statistics about casualties. The LIS (which does not cover all
governorates) indicated that there are approximately 300 casualties per year in surveyed affected
communities.
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THE MINE ACTION PROGRAM
The Republic of Iraq acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty in August 2007, becoming the 155th State
Party. The treaty came into force on 1 February 2008.
The Iraq’s National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) was established in 2003, within the
Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation. It had responsibility for MA policy,
planning, coordination and managing the budget for MA and for donor relations. The work of
NMAA has been affected by corruption, political turbulence, changes of management and
insecurity (kidnapping). Finally in June 2007 the Council of Ministers closed down the NMAA
within the MoPDC.
Although the NMAA was created as the authority for the whole of Iraq, in 2004 the Kurdish
Regional Government assumed responsibility for MA in the three northern governorates of Erbil,
Dahuk and Sulaymaniyah.
UNDP has provided institutional development and local capacity development support to the
NMAA and regional MA centres. UNDP works with one institutional and one senior technical
advisor based in Amman. Both make frequent visits to Iraq. In March 2006 UNDP deployed a
full-time national advisor to northern Iraq to support the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Center
(IKMAC) and the General Directorate for Mine Action (GDMA). It also contracted national
advisers to support the NMAA in Baghdad and Regional Mine Action Center (RMAC) South in
Basra. RONCO, a US commercial clearance company, provided technical support to the NMAA
until the end of September 2006 and continued to support RMAC South until July 2007, when its
adviser moved to Baghdad.
Demining in Iraq is conducted by international forces and the national military, NGOs and
commercial demining operators. A number of international NGOs are present in the country (for
example MAG, DCA, the German NGO HELP, Danish Demining Group, Intersos, ICRC and
NPA). A number of commercial companies are involved in clearance and technical advice (e.g.
Ronco, Tetra Tech ECI). The Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Centre employed nearly 800
operations staff in 61 MA teams in the Kurdish governorates of Erbil and Dahuk at the start of
2006.
Regarding MRE UNICEF assumed de facto coordination of activities in 2007. UNICEF
cooperates with NGOs (e.g. Intersos).
EC SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION
The EC’s support to MA in Iraq is limited to the years 2003 and 2004 (funding decisions in
2003).94 In total there were ten projects funded with a total amount of 9.870.000 Euro. The
funding is divided among AIDCO (funding to UNDP) and DG ECHO (funding to NGOs for
Humanitarian MA).
In 2004 the World Bank and the UN created the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for
Iraq (IRFFI) and the EC contributed to IFRRI.95
The EC has signed a Contribution Agreement with UNDP for a total of € 2 million for MA
activities.96 The funds were channelled through UNDP’s Thematic Trust Fund for Crisis
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96
Contribution Agreement MAP/2003/76135
95

Page 30

Prevention and Recovery (TTF). The funding was part of a larger contribution with a total of € 29
million Euros for recovery activities.97 In addition to this EC contribution, UNDP Iraq also
received funds from other donors through the MA service line of the CPR Thematic Trust Fund.98
The objective of the EC-funded programme was the provision of technical and management
support to the implementation of a LIS, building of local/national MA capacities and
procurement/provision of necessary MA equipment in Iraq. Programme implementation was
constrained by the deteriorating security situation at the time and the limited communication
possible between UNDP and NMAA. The most significant outcome of the program was the LIS.
The Progress Report for the programme states: “The activities under this agreement are to be
implemented exclusively by UNDP.”99 However, at the time UNDP could not deploy
international staff into Iraq. To do the LIS international expertise was required. To overcome the
problem, UNDP through UNOPS contracted to the US Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation
(VVAF) for the provision of Senior Technical Advisor for the Landmine Impact Survey.
Regarding further activities under the programme, it is unclear what has been funded by the EC
and what from other sources. UNDP reporting allocates funding to individual activities. As
known from other Trust Funds, this is rather artificial and the example of UNDP in Iraq shows it
is not always correct. The amounts stated exceed the total EC contribution and the activities do
not match the funding purpose as intended (LIS and Mine Action Capacity Building):
Table 5 – UNDP MA activities in Iraq and EC funding
100

Activity
Contract Danish Demining Group to continue
with clearance operations in the Basrah area
from end of September 2004
Establishment of a local demining NGO in
the Basrah area through an international
NGO/Commercial Company in November
2004

EC funding according to report
$650,000 – EC Funding

Continue funding the LIS Team Leader
through VVAF until May 2005

$270,000

$2,000,000 - $1,300,000 EC Funding

Total EC funding: $2,220,000

The funding to NGOs could not be assessed as the evaluation team did not get access to files and
could not visit Iraq.101
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United Nations Development Programme Iraq Country Office, Progress Report February - August 2004,
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Table 6 – ECHO MA funding to NGOs in Iraq
Partner
HI-F

HI-F
DCA
Danish Refugee Council (Danish
Demining Group)
Danish Refugee Council (Danish
Demining Group)
Intersos
MAG
MAG
NPA

Funding Decision
ECHO/IRQ/210/2003/04002 Emergency
humanitarian aid for the people affected by
landmines and unexploded ordnance
ECHO/IRQ/210/2003/06020 Explosive remnants of
war clearance Baghdad
ECHO/IRQ/210/2003/04006 Humanitarian Mine
Action Response in Southern Iraq
ECHO/IRQ/210/2003/04004 Quick response teams
ECHO/IRQ/210/2003/06007 Capacity Building of
multi skilled EOD teams
ECHO/IRQ/210/2003/04001 Mine Action Rapid
Response
ECHO/IRQ/210/2003/04003 Emergency Mine Action
ECHO/IRQ/210/2003/06010 Humanitarian Mine
Action
ECHO/IRQ/210/2003/04005 Support to Emergency
Landmine and UXO preventive measures
Total

Amount
700.000 Euro

446.000 Euro
1.570.000 Euro
1.100.000 Euro
559.954 Euro
800.000 Euro
718.761 Euro
430.989 Euro
1.000.000 Euro
7.325.704 Euro

In 2006 international donations totalling $35,288,325 (€28,089,091) for MA in Iraq were
reported by 14 countries, an increase of some 27 percent from 2005 ($27.8 million provided by
14 countries).102 The list of donating countries include among non-EU countries the US,
Australia, Switzerland and Norway, and from the EU, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Netherlands, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, and Spain.
MA projects under IRFFI are included in Cluster A called Agriculture, Food Security,
Environment and Natural Resource Management, and involve either UNDP or UNOPS:
Table 7 – MA programmes under IRFFI in Iraq
Title
Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) capacity building
and clearance
Support to the Iraq-Kurdistan Mine Action Centre
Strengthening of National Mine Action Organization In
Southern Iraq
Support for Rural Development and Safer
Environment through Mine Action

Budget
US$
3,340,612

Agency
UNOPS

Approval
date
11.11.04

2,921,852

UNOPS

16.03.06

3,195,797

UNDP

28.09.06

3,231,751

UNDP

04.10.07

KEY ISSUE
Regarding EC funding for Iraq, the dominant feature is that the EC declared it would not fund
operations after 2003. This decision was linked to the security situation and the fact that the EC
cannot ensure proper monitoring and financial oversight without a presence in the country. The
decision is not specific for the MA sector: nevertheless the decision affects the MA sector and
raises some doubts. The following issues can be listed:
•

102

The decision not to fund humanitarian demining is not based on the need for demining.

http://www.icbl.org/lm/2007/iraq.html
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•

•

•

The need to demine did not end in 2003.103
Whereas a long list of donors (European and non-European) are funding MA programs in
Iraq, the EC – one of the main humanitarian donors in the world – is no longer funding.
If the funding procedures of European donors as well as those of the UN allow support to
MA programs in Iraq, it seems odd that this is impossible for the EC.
The operators that received funding until 2003 are still present in the country and
continue the work with funds from other donors but are unable to address all needs
because of the extent of the problem.
In the three other countries covered by this evaluation, the EC is ‘delegating’ oversight
and monitoring to the UN (UNDP). This was the case in Iraq as well but only until 2003.

7. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In the following conclusions from the above observations are listed. Each conclusion is followed
by at least one recommendation. Recommendations are repeated if they stem from more than one
conclusion.
1. EC funding to the region is relevant overall. Funding decisions are taken either at the country
level or in Brussels, which is appropriate. The EU does not follow a regional strategy or approach
for the Middle East. The few regional aspects of MA in the Middle East are outweighed by
national elements (national strategies, national actors), so that there is no need for a regional
approach to MA.
 The EC should continue to work with national approaches in the Middle East and does
not need to think about a regional strategy for MA.
2. The global EC strategy does not play an important role in determining funding decisions. The
global strategy is little known among EC officials and other actors in MA in the region. Some
who work with the global strategy see the global EC strategy as to general to guide decisionmaking. The global strategy is more important at the Brussels level than at country level. Some
EC officials perceive strategic planning and decision taking in the MA sector as difficult due to
the technical aspects and sector specifications.
 The EC should consider more specific guidance to those who are dealing with planning
and MA strategies at national level.
 Guidance could have various forms and could come from a more specific strategy
document, from guidelines that are coming with the global strategy, from experts (inhouse or external), or from compilations of best practice examples.
 To achieve better guidance in MA for the EC delegations, the EC should consider a focal
point at the Brussels level or in the region.
 Alternatively or additionally, EC officials working in EC delegations could be
encouraged and guided to make increased use of external expertise. External expertise for
strategies and planning could have various forms and could be requested from various
sources.
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“The Community's humanitarian aid shall comprise assistance, relief and protection operations (…) to
help people in third countries, particularly the most vulnerable among them, (…), man-made crises, such as
wars and outbreaks of fighting, (…). It shall do so for the time needed to meet the humanitarian
requirements resulting from these different situations. (Article 1 of ECHO’s mandate: Council Regulation
(EC) No 1257/96 of 20 June 1996 concerning humanitarian aid Official Journal L 163 , 02/07/1996 P. 0001 –
0006)
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3. Funding to MA in the Middle East is fragmented. In some cases the funding is not coherent.
Only some common aspects can be identified:
 Funding through the UN in all four countries
 Differentiation between countries in crisis and countries with a more stable environment:
o In the countries with a stable environment, the EC provides low profile support to
the countries’ efforts to comply with the APMBC; funding is rarely provided
continuously but is limited to one project and/or a maximum of three years
o In countries in crisis, the EC reacts quickly regardless of the countries’
commitment to the APMBC; more funds are provided for humanitarian demining
than for support to activities in the region related to the APMBC.
 In countries with a stable environment, the EC should follow the global strategy in a
more coherent way. If the EC decides to support a country’s effort in fulfilling the
APMBC obligations this should be done coherently and based on a strategic approach.
 In countries with an ongoing or recent crisis the EC should continue to fund MA quickly
and flexibly regardless of the countries’ commitment to the APMBC but without
neglecting opportunities for LRRD.
4. Humanitarian Demining is important in the region. Despite being mentioned in the recent EC
global MA strategy, there is no specific strategy for humanitarian demining, nor any guidelines or
a concept on how to integrate humanitarian demining into a reconstruction context.
 The EC should put a higher emphasis on humanitarian demining and in particular on the
challenge of LRRD related to demining. The EC should consider a specific sectoral
strategy for humanitarian demining and related guidelines. To achieve these aspects, DG
ECHO should consider a focal point for MA at Brussels level.
5. The EC generally supports assessments of the MA problem in the region, in particular by
funding LIS. In some contexts the baseline data, methodology and quality of assessments is
insufficient in terms of comprehensiveness and reliability. This is true for both contamination and
the number of casualties.
 The EC should continue to fund assessments in MA. The EC should, in its own
programming but also when coordinating with other actors in MA, increasingly stress the
need to base funding decisions on reliable data.
 In case reliable data is unavailable, the EC should support data collection and analysis in
the region to a larger extent than is currently the case.
6. The emphasis of funding is on clearance which is appropriate overall. In three of the four
countries, a landmine/UXO free country is a realistic option in the medium-term.
 In the four countries assessed, the EC should continue (or in the case of Iraq, start) to
focus funding on clearance activities.
7. EC funding to MA is not explicitly integrated into wider national reconstruction or
development strategies. Links of MA programmes to other EC funded programmes are not
considered consistently. MA programmes contribute to the reconstruction and development
process, e.g. by making scarce agricultural land accessible. The linking however is limited in the
sense that MA programmes take place in the wider reconstruction and development context but
there is no joint planning for broader results or specific emphasis or measures on linkages
between programmes. After the land is made accessible there is no follow-up through other
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initiatives or any other link to reconstructions or development programmes. Actors and donors
seem to be satisfied with this level of coordination.
 Where the EC is funding programmes which do not only have a focus on fast clearance
of contaminated sites, the EC should increase efforts to link MA to reconstruction and
development goals. The EC should not agree to fund standalone MA within a
reconstruction or development context but should encourage actors to plan specifically
for joint goals and achievements under MA and reconstruction or development
programmes.
8. Even in the Lebanon example, where ENPI funded humanitarian demining for an extended
period, the realisation of the LRRD concept remains a challenge. Whereas DG ECHO procedures
are flexible and comparably fast, procedures for other instruments are inflexible and too slow.
The Stability Instrument, as a new instrument, seems to be the right tool to react flexibly but is
not meant to be used to fill all gaps that might occur. The Stability Instrument is not well known
outside the EC, and not known in detail by some inside the EC.
 The EC in the Middle East should put a higher emphasis on humanitarian demining and
in particular on the challenge of LRRD related to demining. The EC should consider a
specific sectoral strategy for humanitarian demining and related guidelines.
 The EC should continue to promote knowledge about new EC instruments inside and
outside the EC.
9. With an annual percentage between 0% and 10% of the overall EC funding to MA in the
world, the Middle East is not a priority region for MA. Before and after the cancellation of the
thematic budget line, EC officials did not pay much attention to MA in the region (with the
exception of humanitarian demining). Today, EC officials deal with MA as part of their portfolio
and the level of engagement depends partly on personal interest and prioritisation of the
individual. The MA sector has to “compete” with other sectors at country level when it comes to
the development and negotiation of CSP.
 The EC should continue to fund MA in the region until all countries have fulfilled their
treaty obligations.
 If the EC is funding MA in the region, it should be strategic and properly followed-up.
To facilitate strategic planning and oversight, the EC should consider a focal point at
Brussels level or in the region.
10. Funding of the EC and of Member States is overall coherent when it comes to selecting target
countries, objectives and approaches. The most significant divergence is the case of Iraq, where
EU Member States fund humanitarian demining but the EC does not.
 The EC should reconsider its strategy regarding funding to MA in Iraq.
11. Coherence in funding to MA in the region is achieved despite the lack of coordination
mechanisms in the countries, the region, or at European capital level. The APMBC and
instruments provide the overall coordination framework for donors, including the EC and
Member States.
There is, nevertheless, a declared interest and potential benefit from information exchange and
coordination between the EC and Member States (as it used to be in the past). This could enhance
donor complementarities and avoid funding gaps. This is only possible if donors exchange
information about their programmes and funding options. For Member States, information
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exchange and coordination could be achieved without much effort as focal points for MA within
the government are in place.
 The EC should consider increased information exchange and coordination with EU
Member States without creating a mechanism that would duplicate coordination under
the APMBC.
 To facilitate information exchange between the EC and Member States, the EC should
consider a focal point at Brussels level.
12. Direct funding to NGOs is generally provided only for humanitarian demining. The procedure
and management follows DG ECHO standard procedures, which is not always appropriate as MA
operations have some features that are different from other sectors. This is particularly the case
for the high start up costs (purchase of specialised and expensive equipment). There is good
contact between the EC and NGOs at national level. The level of knowledge about ways of
working and procedures at both sides, the EC and the NGOs, could nevertheless be improved.
 DG ECHO should consider a specific sectoral strategy for humanitarian demining
including related specific guidelines and procedures.
 To facilitate information exchange between the EC and NGOs, the EC should consider a
focal point at Brussels level or in the region.
13. The EC, as well as other donors, face difficulties in responding to the challenge of cluster
munitions. Weak assessments and difficulties in determining realistic end dates for clearance
activities are a challenge for donors.
 The EC should learn from the response to the cluster munitions problem in South
Lebanon and ensure that, in future contexts, the lessons learnt are applied. This could be
done by developing specific guidelines for cluster munitions problems or by developing
compilations of good practices.
14. By choosing the UN (and in particular UNDP) for the support to national structures, the EC
follows a low profile approach in the region. The level of programme ownership, oversight and
strategic influence is very low. This approach is not consistent with the fact that in Iraq the EC is
not engaged because of the restriction in monitoring and overseeing the activities. The approach
is also not coherent with the fact that the UN (in particular UNMAS as part of the peacekeeping
forces) in South Lebanon,, for procedural reasons, could not be funded by the EC during the
emergency phase.
 The EC should apply a coherent approach when it comes to requirements for oversight
and programme ownership. In particular in Iraq, the EC should reconsider the decision
not to fund MA (or other humanitarian activities) because of the difficulties in
monitoring and controlling.
 DG ECHO should consider funding of humanitarian demining through the UN system
(and in particular of UNMAS) in cases such as Lebanon where the UN is present with
capacities prior, during and after the humanitarian crisis.
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APPENDIX 1 – TERMS OF REFERENCE

Regional evaluation of EC-funded mine actions in the Middle East
2002-2007
1. BACKGROUND
In 2001 the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament adopted two Regulations on the
reinforcement of the EU response against Antipersonnel Landmines (APL).104 These (referred to
collectively as “the Regulation”) laid the foundation of the European integrated and focused
policy.
Article 13, paragraph 1 of the EC Regulation states that: The Commission shall regularly assess
operations financed by the Community in order to establish whether the objectives of the
operations have been achieved and to provide guidelines for improving the effectiveness of future
operations.
The APL Regulation goes on to state: Every three years after entry into force of this Regulation,
the Commission shall submit to the European Parliament an overall assessment of all Community
mine actions… (Article 14)
The EC Mine Action Strategy and Multi-annual Indicative Programme, 2005-2007105 further
specifies that “more specific, geographic, evaluations of EC-funded mine actions, analysing the
results and their impact” will be undertaken to complement the overall assessment.
To implement these provisions, the EC:
3. Commissioned a global assessment of EC mine policy and actions over the period 20022004;
4. Entered into an agreement with The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
(GICHD) to, inter alia, manage the programme of regional evaluations to identify lessons
learned within EC-funded mine action projects in the following regions:106
• Africa
• Asia-Pacific

• Caucasus-Central Asia
• Europe

• Latin America
• Middle East

104

Regulation (EC) 1724/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2001
concerning action against anti-personnel landmines in developing countries (OJ L 234, 1.9.2001,
p.1) and Regulation (EC) 1725/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July
2001 concerning action against anti-personnel landmines in third countries other than developing
countries (OJ L 234, 1.9.2001, p.6). The provisions are similar and we quote from Regulation
(EC) 1724/2001.
105
This is the second strategy and multi-year indicative programme since the adoption of the EC
Regulation: the first covered the period 2002-04.
106
Additional objectives of the EC-GICHD Agreement are to:
• provide a repository and dissemination service for reports from mine action evaluations
and similar studies;
• train people from mine affected countries in evaluation;
• support the participation of key players from mine-affected countries in official meetings
relating to the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT).
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The Report from the Global Assessment was issued in March 2005,107 while the agreement with
the GICHD was concluded in December that year.
2. DESCRIPTION OF THE EVALUATION
The general objective of the Global Assessment was to determine to what extent the objectives
and means set in the APL Regulation had been complied with and used in terms of strategy,
programming, commitments and implementation. The regional evaluations will complement the
Global Assessment by focusing on (i) relevant conclusions and recommendations from the
Global Assessment, and (ii) EC mine action strategy and programming issues at the country
level. Thus, the evaluation will not assess the efficiency, effectiveness, and impact of individual
projects, except to illustrate changes since the Global Assessment or critical programming issues.
Overall objective:
To provide systematic and objective assessments of EC-funded mine actions in the Middle East
to generate credible and useful lessons for decision-makers within the EC, allowing them to
improve the planning and management of existing and future mine action projects, programmes,
and policies.
Specific objectives:
−

−
−

−
−

−
−

To assess the relevance of EC-funded mine activities vis-à-vis:
o the geographic and thematic priorities defined in the Strategies for 2002-2004 and
2005-2007;
o national and regional needs, strategies, and priorities;
o EC Country Strategy Papers and National Indicative Programmes for mine-affected
countries in the Middle East 2002-2006;
o EC strategy documents for the Middle East
To analyze the allocation of EC funds among mine-affected states in the Middle East, and
across the various components of mine action (survey, clearance, MRE, etc.);108
To assess the effectiveness of EC-funded mine action support in:
o addressing the landmine & UXO problems in mine-affected partner countries
o fostering national ownership and the development of local capacities;
o supporting the overall development and rehabilitation priorities/ programmes of the
beneficiary countries;
o supporting local mine action organisations;
To assess the coordination among the EC and other agencies supporting mine action in a
country (regional; national; UN; donors; international NGOs; etc.);
To assess the impact of deconcentration on the planning and delivery of EC support to mine
action in the Middle East, including the capacity of EC delegations to assess proposals for
mine action projects and to monitor/evaluate the implementation of these projects;
To assess the adequacy of the EC national strategies and plans, and the effectiveness of
implementation;
To assess the existence of an ‘exit strategy’ for the country to graduate from donor assistance
(including plans for sustainability);

107

Gasser, Russell and Robert Keeley, Global Assessment of EC Mine Policy and Actions: 20022004.
108
This question addresses, among other issues, the fact that “Commitment to the Mine Ban
Treaty” is one of the criteria listed in the EC Mine Action Strategy 2005-2007 for determining
geographic allocations.
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−
−

−
−

To assess the linkages between mine action and other issues, such as humanitarian
assistance, development, and armed violence reduction
To assess the impact of the end of the specific budget line for anti-personnel landmines and
the introduction of the new “stability instrument” on future mine action support from the EC
to the Middle East;
To make recommendations to improve the identification, design, and implementation of ECfunded mine projects;
To generate recommendations to enhance the opportunities for cross-fertilization among
mine action programmes in the Middle East and globally.

Expected results
The evaluation report shall give an overview of EC mine action support to the Middle East, and
to particular mine-affected countries in the Middle East, since 2002. It shall incorporate more
detailed assessments of EC mine action support in a limited number of ‘focus country’ cases to
illustrate and support its findings, conclusions, and recommendations. Recommendations will aim
in particular to guide EC personnel in designing and implementing programmes of support to
mine action that complement the actions of other actors, including national authorities, other
donors, and UN agencies for the next years.
3. METHODOLOGY
The evaluation shall entail the following main components of work:
− Preliminary Planning & Data Collection (now underway)
− Desk Research
− Country Missions (two of the following – to be confirmed)
o Jordan
o Lebanon
o Yemen
− Analysis and Reporting
Country Missions
As the evaluation will not focus on the performance of individual projects, Evaluation Team
members will spend most or all of their time in capitals and major centres to meet with and
collect documents and data from:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

EC delegations
national authorities and officials from national mine action centres
UN agencies supporting mine action
representatives from other major donors to mine action in that country
representatives from mine action operators (local and international)
other key government officials
representatives from key regional organisation (where present).
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Additional data collection
Additional information will be obtained from:
−
−
−

−
−
−
−
−

Review of project documents (project proposals and contracts; mid-term and final reports, as
well as final evaluations, monitoring reports, audit reports, etc., where available;
Interviews with relevant Commission officials (in Brussels);
Questionnaire surveys and some follow-up telephone interviews with project
managers/implementers/recipients of EC funds and projects (Officials in other EC
Delegations, managers of operator organizations, both in organizations’ headquarters and on
the field, and beneficiary countries’ officials, etc.).
EC Country Strategy Papers and National Indicative Programmes.
National Development Plans, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, and National Mine Action
Strategies from the focus countries
Relevant reports from the UN (including inter-agency assessment mission reports for mine
action) and the World Bank
Recent mine action evaluations commissioned by other agencies
Other sources, as appropriate.

4. OUTPUTS
An evaluation work plan will be prepared and distributed following the preliminary planning and
data collection stage (March 2008).
A debriefing of preliminary findings and conclusions will be provided to EC officials and other
stakeholders at the end of each country mission.
Within one month of the end of the country missions, a draft report will be prepared and
distributed to the GICHD and EC delegations for comments, and subsequently distributed to
other stakeholders. For both comments the deadline is two weeks.
A final report will be submitted to the GICHD and EC Brussels.
All reports will be in English.
All reports will clearly indicate on the cover page that the evaluation was financed by the
European Union and managed by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
(GICHD). The reports should display the logos of both the EU and the GICHD.109

109

http://europa.eu.int/comm/europeaid/visibility/index_en.htm. The GICHD logo shall be
provided by the GICHD.
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Annex 1 to the ToR
Among the key conclusions of the Global Assessment were:
•
•
•

•

•

The need for a transparent process for determining which countries and projects will
receive EC funding for mine action;
In light of ‘deconcentration’, the need to clarify “who does what” in mine action within
the EC;
Request for proposal and selection processes, including:
• The need for more high quality proposals,
• The need to reduce the number of proposals rejected on technicalities, and
• The need for more rigorous assessments – including technical criteria – of proposals
and projects.
Contracting issues, including:
• The need for greater contractual rigour in specifying performance requirements;
• The need for greater clarity in defining the chains of responsibility and authority;
• The limitations inherent in the use of non-renewable contracts issued for short
durations.
All interventions should incorporate exit strategies.
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APPENDIX 2 –PERSONS MET
Last name, first
name
Abadie, Cecile

Organisation

Title/Function

European Commission

Date of
interview
27.06.08

Location/by
phone
Beirut

15.04.08
15.04.08
26.06.08

Sana’a
Sana’a
Tyr, Lebanon
Jordan
Valley
Beirut

Abdul Radib, Ali
Alawi, Ahmed
Albert, Peter
Christopher
Al-Jarrah, Ahmed

YEMAC
YEMAC
DCA

Head of Section ‘Infrastructure
and local development’
Deputy Director
Information Officer
Operation Manager

NCDR

Operation Department manager

05.05.08

Andrews, Stephen

British Embassy

27.06.08

Breikat, Mohammad
Bryant, Stephen
Christiaens, Peter
Clark, Chris

NCDR
NPA
European Commission
Mine Action
Coordination Centre
South Lebanon, United
Nations
European Commission
Embassy of Italy
German Government
Mines Advisory Group
Danish Government

Lieutenant Colonel, Defence
Attaché
Director of the NCDR
Programme Manager
Attaché, Programs Manager
Programme Manager

04.05.08
04.05.08
27.06.09
25.06.08

Amman
Amman
Beirut
Tyre,
Lebanon

Desk Officer Jordan
Deputy Head of Mission
Focal Point for Mine Action
Focal Point for EC funding
Focal Point for Mine Action

5.05.08
14.04.08
5.05.08
21.04.08
8.05.08

By telephone
Sana’a
By telephone
By telephone
By telephone

YEMAC
FSD

Project Officer
Programme Manager Lebanon

15.04.08
2.05.08

Lebanese Armed
Forces, Lebanon Mine
Action Center
Norwegian’s People
Aid

Brigade General,
Director

24.06.08

Sana’a
Email
questionnaire
Beirut

23.06.08

Beirut

24.06.08
24.04.08

Nabatieh
Brussels

15.05.08

By telephone

7.05.08

By telephone

27.06.08
13.04.08

De Waele, Sandra
Di Martino Walter
Discherl, Johannes
Eason, Abigal
Elmund Gam, Hanne
B.
Enas, Ahmed
Fabbroni, Valeria
Fehmi, Mohammad

Furunes, Knut

Gleeson, Andy
Gouzee de Harven,
Antoine

MAG
European Commission

Gross, Peter

European Commission

Hofmokl, Jan

European Commission

Horrocks, David
Horvers Mary

MAG
European Commission

Operations Manager/Programme
Coordinator Mine Action
Programme
Technical Operations Manager
EuropeAid-Cooperation Office,
Unit F 2-Central management of
thematic budget lines
Relex DDG2, Policy Officer Desk Yemen and Gulf
Cooperation Council countries
Relex F.3 Near East, Co-Desk
Officer Lebanon
Country Programme Manager
Programme manager

Horvers, Mary
HRH Prince Mired
Raad Zeid AlHussein
Imad, Mona

European Commission
NCDR

Programme Manager
Chairman of the NCDR

16.04.08
04.05.08

Nabatieh
Sana’a,
Yemen
Sana’a
Amman

DG ECHO, Lebanon
Office

Programme Assistant

24.06.08

Beirut
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Isabelle Combes

DG ECHO

Chef de secteur Questions
politiques, stratégie, financements
thématiques, DG ECHO 01
Programme Manager, Aidco A.2
Middle East
Operations Manager in
Headquarter
Chief Technical Advisor to NCDR
CTA

29.07.08

By telephone

Jensen, Uffe

European Commission

8.05.08

By telephone

Jones, Llewelyn

Mines Advisory Group

21.04.08

By telephone

Juergensen, Olaf
Juergensen, Olaf

UNDP
UNDP

04.05.08
06.05.08
17.04.08

17.04.08
24.04.08

Brussels
Brussels

15.05.08

By telephone
By Email

European Commission

DG ECHO, Unit 2, Central and
Eastern Europe, NIS,
Mediterranean countries, Middle
East
DG ECHO, Desk Officer Yemen
DG External Relations, Unit A4Security Policy
Aidco A.2. Geographical
coordination and supervision for
the Mediterranean and MiddleEast
Programme Manager

Amman
Syrian
Border
Brussels

Koch, Julia

European Commission

Lemasson, Antoine
Liguori, Laura

European Commission
European Commission

Martins, Paulo

European Commission

Mikaela Neijd

07.05.08

Montariol, Bruno

European Commission

EC Delegation Lebanon

07.07.08

Närvi, Jussi

European Commission

24.06.08

Neijd, Mikaela

European Commission

Premier Conseiller, Chef de
Section Coopération
Programme Manager

Amman,
Jordan
Email
questionnaire
Beirut

Peetermans, Michel
Poston, Allan
Rasmussen, Lene

Belgian Government
UNDP
DCA

Focal Point for Mine Action
Chief Technical, LMAC
Programme Manager

9.05.08
24.06.08
26.6.08

Reuss Michael
Robyns, Alain

German Embassy
DG ECHO, Lebanon
Office
USAID
Mine Action
Coordination Centre
South Lebanon, United
Nations
NPA
Swiss Foundation for
Mine Action

Deputy Head of Mission
Technical Assistant

14.04.08
24.06.08

Amman,
Jordan
By telephone
Beirut
Tyre,
Lebanon
Sana’a
Beirut

Assistant Project Manager
Chief of Operations

23.06.08
25.06.08

By telephone
Tyr, Lebanon

Programme Manager
Operations Manager

06.05.08
25.06.08
26.06.08

NMFA
DanChurchAid

Programme Manager
Head of Humanitarian Mine
Action

06.05.08
15.05.2008

Amman
Tyre and
Nabatieh,
Lebanon
Amman
By
Telephone

Rola, El-Solh
Ruru, Kerei

Stephen Bryant
Stoa, Jan Erik

Ulricksen, Hanne
Veble, Eva

04.05.08
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APPENDIX 3 – LIST OF DOCUMENTS CONSULTED
Background documents and Agency Reports
•

Gasser, Russell and Robert Keeley, Global Assessment of EC Mine Policy and Actions:
2002-2004.

•

“Lebanese Army Pounds Fighters at Refugee Camp,” Washington Post, 3 June 2007

•

“In fight against militants, Lebanon bolstered by US, Gulf countries,” Christian Science
Monitor, 4 June 2007.

•

Presentation MACC SL, Tyre, 19 March 2007 and Damage and Early Recovery Needs
Assessment of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, Food and Agriculture Organisation,
November 2006

•

Counting the Cost, The economic impact of cluster munition contamination in Lebanon,
by Greg Crowther, Landmine Action, May 2008,

•

B. Pound et al., “Departure of the Devil: Landmines and Livelihoods in Yemen,“ Volume
1, Main Report, Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD),
Geneva, 2006

•

Mid-Term Outcome Evaluation for Strengthening National Capacity for Mine Action in
Yemen - Phase II; GICHD, June 2005

•

Report on the use of EC contributions channelled through UNDP’s Thematic Trust Fund
for Crisis Prevention and Recovery 6 September 2004

•

United Nations Development Programme Iraq Country Office, Progress Report February
- August 2004, 6 September 2004, page 4 and Progress Report Progress Report February
- November 2004, 16 November 2004

•

United Nations Mine Action Service, Annual Report 2006, New York

•

German Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Guidelines for funding humanitarian demining
„Leitlinien zur Förderung von Projekten der humanitären Minen- und
Kampfmittelräumung

•

durch das Auswärtige Amt“ Berlin, 18.01.2008

•

Denmark’s support to Mine Action, Strategy, October 2006

•

Sida’s Contributions to Humanitarian Mine Action Final Report Sida Evaluation 01/06

•

United Nations Development Programme Iraq Country Office Report on the use of EC
contributions channelled through UNDP’s Thematic Trust Fund for Crisis Prevention
and Recovery 6 September 2004

•

United Nations Development Programme Iraq Country Office Progress Report Jan-June
2004; 14 July 2004 Mine Action Support to Iraqi National Mine Action Authority

•

United Nations Development Programme, Iraq Country Office Progress Report February
- November 2004; 16 November 2004; Support to the National Mine action Authority
(NMAA) in Capacity Building

•

Lebanon Mine Action Program National Demining Office, Working for a Lebanon Free
From The Impact of Landmines, Long Term Plan 2008-2012
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•

Country Program Action Plan between the Government of the Republic of Yemen and
the United Nations Development Programme, 2007 - 2011

EC Documentation
•

European Community, The European Roadmap towards a Zero Victim Target, The EC
Mine Action Strategy & Multi-annual Indicative Programming 2005-2007,
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/mine/docs/strategy_0507_en.pdf

•

EC Council Regulation (EC) 1724/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 23 July 2001 concerning action against anti-personnel landmines in developing
countries (OJ L 234, 1.9.2001, p.1)

•

EC Regulation (EC) 1725/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July
2001 concerning action against anti-personnel landmines in third countries other than
developing countries (OJ L 234, 1.9.2001, p.6)

•

European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), Regional Strategy Paper
(2007-2013) http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/enpi_euromed_rsp_en.pdf

•

Country Strategy Papers and National Indicative Programs
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed/index_en.htm

•

EU Cooperation Partners and Programs in Lebanon
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/countrycooperation/lebanon/lebanon_en.htm

•

Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on
Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD), COM (1996) 153 final of
30.04.1996. See also, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the
European Parliament: Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development – An assessment,
COM (2001) 153 final of 23.04.2001
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APPENDIX 4 – ASSESSMENT OF COUNTRY PROGRAMS AGAINST STRATEGY OBJECTIVES

Strategy

Yemen

Jordan

Lebanon

Iraq

Yemen is facing a landmines and
ERW problem over the past thirty
years. LIS completed in July 2000
identified mine-affected villages in
nineteen out of the country’s twentyone governorates. It recorded a total
of 4,904 casualties over the past ten
years were recorded, of which 2,560
were killed and 2,344 injured. Impact
on access to critical resources, and
blocking access to land. Impact on
infrastructure development and the
implementation of social
development projects.

Conflict: no but mines were laid
related to potential conflict with
neighbors
Post Conflict: Israeli invasion in 70s

Post conflict: yes
Israel left Lebanon and left mines
behind 306 communities affected

Human suffering: 1428
communities affected,
approximately 300 casualties
per year

National programme with focus on
local capacity exists.

Local capacity: Mine action was the
responsibility of the army (Royal
Engineers)

Country
Strategy 2002-2004
Overall objective
To alleviate human suffering, increase
humanitarian security while, at the same time,
stabilising post-or frozen- conflict regions,
recreating an environment in which people
can live safely and economic, health and
social development can occur free from
constraints imposed by the hidden treat of
mines, and ensuring that victims needs are
addressed.

Focus on local capacity as well as on
continuing mine clearance. (After that period,
(…), the main financial effort might focus on
mine clearing and victim assistance.)

LIS co-funded by the EU
•
•

Very few victims
Very ltd. effect on farming

Lebanon not in the focus of the EU;
sporadic funding of one MAG
intervention

Local capacity building: no, only if in
combination with funding to MAC SL
(needs to be checked)

Local capacity exists partly:
NMAA failed but IKMAC for
Kurdistan exists

Victim assistance: no
Structure for both local capacity and
victim assistance was in place:
under LMAC there is MRE and MVA
National Steering Committee

Thematic Priorities
1. Actions to eliminate the AP Landmine/UXO
Threat to affected populations and the
alleviation of its effects on them
2. Actions to create and reinforce local
capacity and mine action efficiency and
effectiveness

The government was working
towards the elimination of the
problem.
Other actors work with the
government in the mine action
sector (UNDP started support in
1999 to support the national
capacity).

Same as above

Same as above

Same as above

Same as above

Same as above

Same as above
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Geographic Priorities
Priority for support will be given to countries
severely affected by the scourge of APL/UXO,
which made and are making significant efforts
to join the Mine Ban Treaty. Due attention will
be given to populations of non-signatory
countries. When aid is provided to non-Mine
Ban Treaty signatories, the impact of the
assistance on the country’s willingness to
accede will be taken into consideration for
future support.
Countries severely to moderately affected by
APL/UXO problem
Countries/territories moderately to lightly
affected with concentration of the threat in
areas of high risk for the populations and/or
for the socio-economic development
Prioritisation of the problem within the national
framework (complementarity with geographic
or other horizontal resources or reinforcement
of the capacity of the geographic resources or
compensation for the absence of those
resources)

Strategic importance for the EU (proximity to
EU or political context or relation to already
started assistance programmes which are
blocked by pending mine issues.)

Cross cutting priorities (eg. tackle
humanitarian crisis, facilitate rapid
interventions)

The government of Yemen is
committed
to
the
complete
elimination of landmines
and
explosive remnants of war. The
Government signed the AntiPersonnel Mine Ban Convention in
1997 and ratified it in September
1998, the first country in the Middle
East region to do so.

Severely affected: no

About 48-72 accidents annually.

See above

Lebanon not signatory to APMBC

Severely affected: yes

LIS shows high, medium and low
impacted
communities
(28
communities were rated high)
Same as above

See above

APMBC: Yes

See above

Same as above

The National Mine Action Committee
(NMAC) was established in 1998
and formulated a national mineaction
strategy.
The
Yemen
Executive Mine Action Centre
(YEMAC) was established in 1999
as the implementing body of the
NMAC with the primary responsibility
of coordinating all mine-action
activities in the country.

National framework: NCDR

Yes, national plans exist (check
again)

Weak national framework but
regional
frameworks
exist
(Kurdish part)

EU country strategy focuses on
private sector development, food
security, poverty reduction, good
governance, democracy and respect
of human rights.

Check when the national committee
was created

Lebanon falls within the EU
Neighborhood policy (presented in
2003)
Others?

No strategic importance for the
EU

Many EU MS were funding UNDP
for the support of YEMAC (Italy,
France, Belgium, Netherlands, UK,
Germany, Sweden + non EU donors
such as US, Canada, UAE).
DG ECHO finances humanitarian
programmes.

Before crisis in 2006 Lebanon was
not much in the focus of donors
(check EU overall budgets for
Lebanon in periods)
-

check if other countries do as well
No

Large
scale
humanitarian
needs and funding.
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Strategy 2005-2007
Strategic Objective
To drastically reduce the lingering threat and
impact of landmines in the context of
increased local security and regional
confidence.

Regarding threat and impact see
above.

No.

ECHO and subsequent funding did
drastically reduce threat and impact
of cluster ammunition in the South.
No funding to clearing of landmines.
Local security: yes
Regional confidence: -

Human
suffering:
1428
communities
affected,
approximately 300 casualties
per year.

Regarding threat and impact see
above.

Yes.

Yes.

Threat from APL: yes, see
above.

Regarding threat,
suffering see above.

No.

No.

Yes.

Funding to international NGOs incl.
capacity building but it is limited to
individuals. (check with FSD)
Funding to UNDP is capacity
building with LMAC and some future
local NGOs.

Suffering and need for socioeconomic
reintegration
is
given.
Structures are weak but exist in
some parts of the country.

Yes, see above.
Development need: yes
Humanitarian funding: yes

Commitment is given
If yes, then development need.
As country does not have very much
fertile area the cleared area is of
importance.

Lebanon is not signatory
Humanitarian: yes in 2006 and 2007
Development need: South yes
Rest of the country: not clear.

Commitment is given.
High humanitarian need
given.

Strategic Importance for the EU.

No

-

ENP: yes
Besides: yes
Important case for the signatory
process of the cluster treaty.

No strategic importance for the
EU.

Sustainability and Coherence with Wider
Assistance.

EU strategy is focuses good
governance and poverty alleviation
(in particular health).
Mine Action is not mentioned in any
CSP or NIP.

-

Yes, cluster would have blocked the
South entirely and would have
hampered overall assistance to the
country.

Assistance is provided by other
donors and actors.

Proven Commitment of Non-States Parties to
Mine Action and the Principles of the APMBC.

Yes, see above.

N.a.

Lebanon is still not signatory but the
government is keen to get rid of the
problem and not to produce more
mines and to get rid of the stockpile.

Commitment exists but state
parties partly fail.

Thematic Objectives
To reduce the Anti-personnel Landmine
Threat (MRE, detection, marking, fencing,
clearance, destruction of stockpiled APL).
To Alleviate Mine Victim Suffering and Aid
Socio-Economic Reintegration (Supporting or
creating local victim assistance services).
To Enhance Local and Regional Impacts of
Effective Mine Action Capacity (support to
national/local) mine action structures, LIS).

Geographic Priorities
Commitment to the Mine Ban Treaty.
High Humanitarian and Development Need.

impact

National Mine Action
NMAC, YEMAC.

and

Capacity:
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is

Efficiency and Effectiveness of Local/National
Mine Action Planning Programmes.

Yes, see above.

Yes.

Strong local set up incl. UN and
Army exists in the South.
Set up with Army and UNDP exists
for the rest of the country.

Local/National Mine Action
Planning Programmes are
weak.
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APPENDIX 5 – OPEN INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE
Evaluation criteria

General Evaluation questions

Relevance

•

The extent to which the aid activity
is suited to the priorities and
policies of the target group,
recipient
and
donor.

•

•

To what extent are the objectives of the
programme still valid?
Are the activities and outputs of the
programme consistent with the overall goal
and the attainment of its objectives?
Are the activities and outputs of the
programme consistent with the intended
impacts and effects?

Specific Evaluation Questions

•
•
•

•

•
•
Effectiveness

•

A measure of the extent to which an
aid activity attains its objectives.

•

To what extent were the objectives achieved /
are likely to be achieved?
What were the major factors influencing the
achievement or non-achievement of the
objectives?

•
•
•

•

What are the national and regional needs, strategies, and
priorities in terms of mine action?
How are these needs assessed?
What are the geographic (regional?) and thematic priorities
defined in the EC Strategies for 2002-2004 and 20052007?
What is the allocation of EC funds among mine-affected
states in the Middle East, and across the various
components of mine action (survey, clearance, MRE, etc.)?
How adequate is the process for determining which
countries and projects will receive funding?
How transparent is the process of determining funding?
To what extend were the landmine & UXO problems in
mine-affected partner countries addressed?
To what extend were national ownership and the
development of local capacities fostered?
To what extend were the overall development and
rehabilitation priorities/ programmes of the beneficiary
countries supported?
In how far were local mine action organisations supported?
Which ones? Through which Implementation Channels?
Compare strength/weaknesses of NGOs vs. Government
vs. UN.
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•

•

•

•

Efficiency
Efficiency measures the outputs -qualitative and quantitative -- in
relation to the inputs. It is an
economic term which signifies that
the aid uses the least costly

•
•
•

Were activities cost-efficient?
Were objectives achieved on time?
Was the programme or project implemented in
the most efficient way compared to
alternatives?

•

•

In how far did the process of deconcentration and the
question of who does what in mine action within the EC
impact on the planning and delivery of EC support to mine
action in the Middle East, including the capacity of EC
delegations to assess proposals for mine action projects
and to monitor/evaluate the implementation of these
projects (incl. an assessment of technical understanding of
EC Delegation staff)?
To what extend did the end of the specific budget line for
anti-personnel landmines and the introduction of the new
“stability instrument” impact on future mine action support
from the EC to the Middle East; How does the introduction
of the European Neighbourhood Policy influence funding in
mine action?
In how far did contracting issues influence the
achievement of the objectives (contractual rigour in
specifying performance requirements, clarity in defining
chains of responsibility and authority, limitations inherent in
the use of non-renewable contracts issued for short
durations)?
How do implementing partners see the collaboration with
the EC? How important is the EC as a funding
organization? How do they perceive the contractual
arrangements, supervision and reporting?
In how far has the process of requiring and selecting
projects as well as contracting have an influence on the
timely delivery of activities?
Are there alternative ways of funding and would there be
more cost efficient?
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resources possible in order to
achieve the desired results. This
generally
requires
comparing
alternative approaches to achieving
the same outputs, to see whether
the most efficient process has been
adopted.
Impact
The positive and negative changes
produced
by
a
development
intervention, directly or indirectly,
intended or unintended. This
involves the main impacts and
effects resulting from the activity
on the local social, economic,
environmental
and
other
development
indicators.
The
examination should be concerned
with both intended and unintended
results and must also include the
positive and negative impact of
external factors, such as changes
in terms of trade and financial
conditions.

•
•
•

What has happened as a result of the
programme or project?
What real difference has the activity made to
the beneficiaries?
How many people have been affected?

•
•

•

Sustainability

•

Sustainability is concerned with
measuring whether the benefits of
an activity are likely to continue
after donor funding has been

•

To what extent did the benefits of a
programme or project continue after donor
funding ceased?
What were the major factors which influenced
the achievement or non-achievement of

•

•

What is the impact of the programme or project and how
much of the change can be attributed to the EU funding
What real difference has the activity made to the
beneficiaries (change in number of victims, access to land,
statements of perception of security, etc)?
Did the changes have any influence on the conflict/the
reconstruction process/ development process?

In how far did the EC foresee and plan for an ‘exit
strategy’ for the country to graduate from donor assistance
(including plans for sustainability);
In how far is the end state clearly defined and commonly
agreed between actors. In how far is there sufficient
data/the situation known to define an exit strategy (survey)?
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sustainability of the programme or project?

withdrawn. Projects need to be
environmentally
as
well
as
financially sustainable.

•
•

•

Coherence/Complementarity/
Coordination
The need to assess security,
developmental, trade and military
policies as well as humanitarian
policies, to ensure that there is
consistency and, in particular, that
all policies take into account
humanitarian and human-rights
considerations.

This

criterion

may

have

several

dimensions:

1) Coherence within the Commission's development
programme
•

Example: Can it be said that the activities and
outputs logically allow the objectives to be
achieved? Are there contradictions between
the different levels of objective? Are there
duplications between the activities?

2) Coherence/complementarity with the partner
country's policies and with other donors' interventions
•

3)

Example: Can it be said that there is no
overlap between the intervention considered
and other interventions in the partner country
and/or other donors' interventions, particularly
Member States?

In how far is the exit strategy linked to impact (risk to leave
before all risk areas are cleared);
In how far does the strategy foresee/link up with long-term
challenges (development, land rights and land disputes,
etc.)
In case of humanitarian demining, who does the concept of
Linking Relief Rehabilitation and Development-LRRD?
Which elements in EU funding are in favour of LRRD and
which ones do hamper them? What would be alternatives?

1) Specific activity vs. overall objective
•
•

Activity vs. Ottawa convention/Mine Ban Treaty
Activity vs. humanitarian objectives

2) EC intervention vs. other actors intervention (partner country,
other EC member State)
•
•
•
•

What are other actors’ interventions related to Mine Action?
In how are these interventions taken into account in EC’s
planning and implementation?
Is there overlap, influence, or duplication?
To what extend did the intervention add benefits to what
would have resulted from Member States' interventions only
in the partner country. To what extent has the sharing of
roles between the EC and Member States contributed to
optimise the impact of the support?

3) EC Mine Action objective vs. other EU objectives
•

What are the EU objectives on regional and national level?
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Coherence/complemehttp://www.worldvision.org/ntarity
with the other Community policies
•

Example: Is there convergence between the
objectives of the intervention and those of the
other Community policies (trade, agriculture,
fishing, etc.)?

•
•
•

In hare far are they taken into account in EC’s Mine Action
planning and implementation?
Is there any positive/negative influence?
Influence of EU reform on Mine Action: Under which Pillar
comes Mine Action (first or second)? How is nongeographic funding possible under new instruments?

4) Coordination
4) Coordination among the EC and other agencies
supporting mine action in a country (regional; national;
UN; donors; international NGOs; etc.)

•

•
•

What are the coordination mechanisms related to Mine
Action? What is the role of MACs? How do they fulfill their
role and what is influencing it?
What role does the EC play in these coordination
mechanisms?
In how far are EC interventions influenced by these
coordination mechanisms?
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